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I.R.C. Section 71: Breaking Up is Hard to Do
John A. Lynch, Jr.*
If it is true that an unhappy marriage is a zero sum game, it is no
less true that the financial arrangements incident to the mar-
riage's dissolution perpetuate that game. And when a marriage
made in heaven plummets to earth, the postlapsarian ceremonies
are presided over by that most fallen of angels" the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code which demand simplicity in statement and application more
than those which control the tax treatment of payments incident
to separation and divorce: I.R.C. section 71, and its companion
provision, I.R.C. section 215.' Such payments, whether pursuant
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. A.B., St. Anselm's
College (1971); J.D., George Washington University (1974); LL.M., George
Washington University (1978).
The writer wishes to express his thanks to William T. Reece, III of the Bar
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1. Stock v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 614, 615 (5th Cir. 1977).
2. I.R.C. § 71 (1976) determines whether payments are income to the reci:
pient:
Alimony and separate maintenance payments
(a) General Rule
(1) Decree of divorce or separate maintenance
If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income in-
cludes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received after such decree in discharge of (or attributable to property
transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation
which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or in-
curred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument in-
cident to such divorce or separation.
(2) Written separation agreement
If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a written separa-
tion agreement executed after the date of the enactment of this title, the
wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at
regular intervals) received after such agreement is executed which are
made under such agreement and because of the marital or family relation-
ship (or which are attributable to property transferred, in trust or other-
wise, under such agreement and because of such relationship). This
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to judicial decree or settlement agreement, are often arranged in
paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make a single return
jointly.
(3) Decree for support
If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's gross income in-
cludes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received by her after the date of the enactment of this title from her hus-
band under a decree entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the husband
to make the payments for her support or maintenance. This paragraph
shall not apply if the husband and wife make a single return jointly.
(b) Payments made to support minor children
Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment which the
terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an amount
of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the sup-
port of minor children of the husband. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, if any payment is less than the amount specified in the decree,
instrument, or agreement, then so much of such payment as does not ex-
ceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a payment for such
support.
(c) Principal sum paid in installments
(1) General rule
For purposes of subsection (a), installment payments discharging a part
of an obligation the principal sum of which is, either in terms of money or
property, specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall not be
treated as periodic payments.
(2) Where period for payment is more than 10 years
If, by the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal
sum referred to in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a
period ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree, instru-
ment, or agreement, then (notwithstanding paragraph (1)) the installment
payments shall be treated as periodic payments for purposes of subsection
(a), but (in the case of any one taxable year of the wife) only to the extent
of 10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the part of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after
the taxable year of the wife in which it is received shall be treated as an
installment payment for the taxable year in which is ig received.
(d) Rule for husband in case of transferred property
The husband's gross income does not include amounts received which,
under subsection (a), are (1) includible in the gross income of the wife, and
(2) attributable to transferred property.
Id.
I.R.C. § 215 (1976) makes payments deductible by the paying spouse if they are
income to the recipient:
Alimony, etc., payments
(a) General rule
In the case of a husband described in section 71, there shall be allowed
as a deduction amounts includible under section 71 in the gross income of
his wife, payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year. No
deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sentence with respect to
any payment if, by reason of section 71(d) or 682, the amount thereof is
not includible in the husband's gross income.
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an atmosphere of strident adversariness and can have longstand-
ing tax and other consequences.
Unfortunately, the body of tax law concerning divorce-related
payments is not simple or predictable for the average taxpayer,
and undoubtedly, in many cases, the processes of divorce and
separation are the participants' first personal experience with
litigation or legal negotiations. While a casual review of the
classified advertising pages of many newspapers demonstrates
an increasing availability of moderately priced legal assistance in
domestic relations matters, at least two decisions indulgently in-
dicate that, in some respects, the law is too complicated for
lawyers.' This article examines the structure of the tax law with
respect to divorce-related payments and considers the rationality
of its development in light of Congress's intent in three specific
areas: (1) the definition of an obligation of support; (2) the dif-
ferentiation between a support obligation and a property in-
terest; and (3) the periodic payment requirement. Finally some
suggestions are made to simplify the code with respect to such
payments.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX LAW WITH RESPECT TO
DIVORCE-RELATED PAYMENTS
Section 71 originated with earnest congressional good inten-
tions. Before 1942, alimony or separate maintenance payments
paid by a taxpayer to his spouse or former spouse were not de-
ductible by the payor or income to the recipient.' The cash flow
problems caused by not permitting spouses paying alimony to
deduct such payments were exacerbated by the substantial in-
creases in federal taxes necessary to finance World War II.5 As
3. See Karageorgevitch v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003, 1006
(1979) (attorney's characterization in a divorce decree of payments held not
binding because attorney was not a tax specialist); Tracy v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 397, 398 (1978) (an attorney unfamiliar with tax law handles his own
divorce). In these cases, the Tax Court took pains to note that attorneys involved
were not tax attorneys.
In Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 551 n.7 (1979), the court hinted that
the law under I.R.C. § 71 is not now clear enough to make tax planning by the
parties feasible.
4. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
5. Sections 102 and 103 of the Revenue Act of 1942 substantially increased
the rates of the normal tax and surtax on personal incomes, respectively, and
section 172 imposed an additional victory tax. Ch. 619, 56 Stat. 802, 884 (1942).
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Representative Disney, a House sponsor of the Revenue Act of
1942, remarked in floor debates:
The present law does not permit the husband any deduction on
account of alimony or separate maintenance payments to the wife
and does not treat such payments as income to the wife. With the
increased rates applicable to individuals, many husbands com-
pelled to make large alimony payments will not have enough in-
come left to pay their income tax.
The amount of a husband's income which goes to the wife as
alimony under a court order is in reality not income to him at all
since he has no control over it as to the use to which it is put.'
This concern led to the enactment of section 120 of the
Revenue Act of 1942' which added sections 22(k) and 23(u) to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. These sections were subsequent-
ly renumbered as sections 71 and 215 respectively, in the 1954
Code.'
I.R.C. section 71(a) provides that periodic payments received
by a wife9 who is divorced or legally separated from her hus-
band, whether under a decree or agreement, are included in the
wife's gross income if such payments are in discharge of a legal
6. 88 CONG. REC. 6575 (1942).
7. See supra note 5.
8. Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§ 22(k) and 23(u), ch. 619, § 120, 56
Stat. 816, were renumbered I.R.C. sections 71 and 215 respectively in the 1954
Code. Section 22(k) of the 1939 Code is essentially the same as section 71(a)(1),
(b), (c), and (d) of the 1954 Code. See supra note 2. Section 23(u) of the 1939 Code
is essentially the same as section 215 of the 1954 Code. Section 71(a)(2) and (3) were
added in the 1954 codification, 68A Stat. 19, to apply I.R.C. section 71 to
payments made under a written separation agreement or under any type of
decree, whether or not they are called separate maintenance payments. STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 83D CONG., 2D SESS., SUM-
MARY OF THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, at 7
(Comm. Print 1955).
9. By virtue of I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17), when payments are made by or on
behalf of the wife, the term "husband" in the statute is read "wife" and the
term "wife" is read "husband." Even in 1942, Rep. Disney was concerned about
public reaction to the use of gender in the statute:
So I know the press will have a lot of fun over a rather ridiculous looking
paragraph in the bill, but it cannot be done in any other way, so that we
will have to take our medicine for having willfully drafted an amendment
that looks ridiculous. If there was any other way of doing it, of course, out
of deference to the ladies, we would not have drafted the bill in this way,
because it is a fact that wives do sometimes settle money on their
husbands.
88 CONG. REC. 6575 (1942).
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obligation imposed upon or incurred by the husband because of
the marital or family relationship.1" The meaning of "periodic
payments" is not clearly set forth by the statute, and while there
is case law support for defining "periodic" as indefinite in dura-
tion and amount, 1 the term has taken on other connotations. 2
Under I.R.C. section 215 a paying spouse may deduct, in the
year in which they are paid, amounts includible in the gross in-
come of the recipient.'3 Thus, a shifting of income is permitted in
the situations specified in section 71 based on the recognition
that the paying spouse lacks control over amounts paid to the
recipient.
I.R.C. section 71(c) is generally concerned with payments
representing installments on a principal sum. The terms "in-
stallments" and "principal sum" are not defined in the statute or
in the committee reports."' Under I.R.C. section 71(c)(1), install-
ment payments are not periodic and therefore are neither gross
income to the recipient nor deductible by the payor. Under I.R.C.
section 71(c)(2), however, if the principal sum is to be paid over a
period that exceeds ten years, installment payments are deemed
periodic and, hence, income to the recipient and deductible by
the payor. Deductibility is limited to ten percent of the principal
sum in any one year.
The Treasury Department has promulgated a regulation con-
tradicting this apparent meaning of the statute. 5 Under the
regulations, if payments are to be made over a specified period
of ten years or less and may be terminated on the occurrence of
certain contingencies, such as the death of* either spouse or
remarriage of the recipient, or the payments may be modified
upon a change in the economic circumstances of the parties, the
payments are deductible by the payor. The contingencies need
10. I.R.C. § 71(a). See supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 554 (1979).
12. In neither the House nor the Senate Reports accompanying the
Revenue Act of 1942 was the term "periodic" defined. See H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-74 (1942); S. REP. No. 1683, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-87
(1942).
13. I.R.C. § 215. See supra note 2.
14. Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the Revenue Act of
1942 generally regarded such installments as not periodic. See H.R. REP. NO.
2333, supra note 12; S. REP. No. 1683, supra note 12.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d)(3) (1960).
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not be specified in the agreement or decree; if they are imposed
by local law, they may transform what appear to be payments
that are not covered by section 71 into periodic payments."
Whether this amplification of the statute is consistent with Con-
gress's intent, or is sensible, is examined below.
Divorce-related payments, in order to fall within I.R.C. section
71, must not only be periodic, but must also be made "in
discharge of a legal obligation which, because of the marital or
family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband
under the decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation."17 In other words, payments representing
compensation for a property interest of the recipient are not
deductible by the payor or income to the recipient.18 The regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to section 71 provide further ex-
planation of what constitutes payments pursuant to a legal
obligation of support. Such payments must be "in the nature of
or in lieu of alimony or an allowance for support." 9 Congress used
the description of a support obligation in section 71 in order to
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d)(3)(ii)(a) (1960).
17. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1).
18. This is clear in both the House and Senate Reports, H.R. REP. No.
2333, supra note 12, at 72; S. REP. No. 1683, supra note 12, at 84.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(a) (1960). Section 1.71-1(b)(4) of the regulations pro-
vides guidance as to what constitutes a property interest rather than support:
Scope of section 71(a. Section 71(a) applies only to payments made
because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general
obligation to support which is made specific by the decree, instrument or
agreement. Thus, section 71(a) does not apply to that part of any periodic
payment which is attributable to the repayment by the husband of, for ex-
ample, a bona fide loan previously made to him by the wife, the satisfac-
tion of which is specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement as a
part of the general settlement between the husband and wife.
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957).
Section 1.71-1(c)(4) is also instructive:
Section 71(a)(1) or (2) does not apply to that part of any periodic payment
attributable to that portion of any interest in property transferred in
discharge of the husband's obligation under the decree or instrument inci-
dent to the divorce status or legal separation status, or transferred pur-
suant to the written separation agreement, which interest originally
belonged to the wife. It will apply, however, if she received such interest
from her husband in contemplation of or as an incident to the divorce or
separation without adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, other than the release of the husband or his property from marital
obligations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(4) (1957).
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provide uniform treatment for payments in the nature of alimony
regardless of the variance in state law with respect to alimony.2"
Whether this language has been construed to achieve this objec-
tive is examined below.
It is apparent that a citizen of average intelligence would not be
able to look at section 71 and determine much about the tax conse-
quences of divorce." If the average citizen might have trouble
navigating the terminology of section 71, the courts have not had
much success applying it in a manner that fosters predictability
and planning. The remainder of this article considers the tor-
tuous development of the case law under section 71 in three very
difficult areas.
III. THE DEFINITION OF AN OBLIGATION OF SUPPORT
It is clear that the major congressional objective with respect
to enactment of the predecessor of section 71 was to tax pay-
ments that represented a diversion of disposable income to the
recipient of such payments regardless of variations in local law.'
Immediately prior to enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942,
the sole tax benefit available in the domestic relations area was
the ability of divorced taxpayers in some jurisdictions to set up a
20. H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 12, at 72.
21. Perhaps the parties to most divorces need not worry much about
distinguishing deductible support payments from nondeductible payments
representing a property settlement. As one judge stated: "In the vast majority
of cases the trial judge has the problem of dividing the meager loaves and
fishes without the aid of a miracle." Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272
A.2d 586, 587 (1970). Certainly, however, the law of taxation in the area of
domestic relations should be simple enough for unsophisticated taxpayers to
understand.
22. As Randolph Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury,
testified:
Generally speaking, alimony payments are not subject to tax in the hands
of a divorced wife. Even where irrevocable trusts have been established,
and the husband has no further interest in the trust property, the income
of the alimony trust is nevertheless taxable to him because it is used to
pay an alimony obligation. Rising tax rates have in some cases absorbed
the entire income of the husband required to pay the tax on his income
and that of his divorced wife. At the same time, divorced wives receiving
tax-free alimony possess a privileged status under our tax laws which
relieves them of any share of the tax burden.
Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 92 (Part I 1942) (statement of Randolph Paul, Tax
Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury).
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trust, the income of which was payable to the grantor's former
spouse, and have the income taxed to the recipient. The income,
used to support the former spouse, was taxed to the former
spouse as long as under state law no legal obligation of support
survived the divorce decree. 3 This was an exception to the rule
in Douglas v. Willcuts,24 that income used to pay a support
obligation of a divorced -grantor was taxable to the grantor.
Thus, in jurisdictions where a legal obligation of support sur-
vived the divorce decree, the trust income paid to the grantor's
former spouse was attributed to the grantor."5
The Senate Finance Committee recognized the unfairness not
only of taxing a payor on income used to support his divorced
spouse but also of the variations entailed in determining the in-
cidence of taxation on the basis of state law. In 1941, the Com-
mittee proposed a provision, as part of the Revenue Act of
1941,6 which was substantially the. same as the predecessor to
I.R.C. section 71 enacted in the Revenue Act of 1942.27 The
reports accompanying the 1941 and the enacted 1942 proposals
indicate that Congress intended to eliminate the reference to
state law to determine the existence of a support obligation. 8
The clear dichotomy drawn by Congress in the predecessor to
23. See Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940).
24. 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935).
25. See Helvering v. Leonard" 310 U.S. 80 (1940); Helvering v. Fitch, 309
U.S. 149 (1940). See also, Gornick, Taxation of Alimony Trusts: A Need for Con-
gressional Reform, 20 TAXES 529 (1942).
26. 55 Stat. 687 (1941).
27. This provision was deferred by agreement of the House and Senate
committees for later consideration. See H.R. REP. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (Conference Report). See also supra note 8.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 12, at 72; S. REP. No. 1683, supra
note 12, at 83. See also S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1941):
[T]he amended sections will produce uniformity in the treatment of
amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless of the
variance in the laws of different States concerning the existence and con-
tinuance of any obligation to pay alimony. In this respect the amendments
are designed to remove the uncertainty as to the tax consequences of
payments made to a divorced spouse out of the net income of so-called'ir-
revocable alimony trusts, arising from the recent Supreme Court decis-
ions in Helvering v. Fitch, ((1940) 309 U.S. 149), Helvering v. Fuller ((1940)
310 U.S. 69), and Helvering v. Leonard, ((1940) 310 U.S. 80), which deci-
sions made the test of whether such income is taxable to the husband the
existence of a continuing legal obligation under State law.
[Vol. 20:173
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section 71 was between payments representing a support obliga-
tion of the payor and those representing a property interest of
the recipient. This intent has been recognized by the Tax Court:
A review of the cases in the "support" area reveals that the
courts have not focused merely on whether the payments are for
"support" - rather the approach has been to determine whether
the payments are for support in contradistinction to being in ex-
change for the wife's release of some property interest. The ques-
tion of whether a payment is in recognition of the husband's
obligation of support (and is, therefore, made because of the
marital or family relationship) is meaningful only if it is con-
sidered in connection with the question of whether the payments
are in recognition of and for the extinguishment of some property
interest of the wife. If the payments are of the former sort, they
are probably periodic and hence section 71 income to the wife.'
A. Payments After Divorce
Whether payments represent a support obligation or a proper-
ty interest can be a difficult inquiry." Unfortunately, recent Tax
Court decisions have further clouded section 71 by creating a
class of payments which, though not attributable to any
demonstrable property interest of the recipient, are not deducti-
ble because they are not attributable to an obligation of support
arising out of the marital or family relationship. The Tax Court
has created this class of payments by examining whether, under
state law, an obligation of support survives the divorce. This
flies in the face not only of the congressional intent that
payments constituting or resembling alimony be treated uniform-
ly, but also of several earlier decisions of the Tax Court3' and a
well-reasoned opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Taylor v. Campbell," the leading case involving tax treat-
ment of support payments after an absolute divorce in states
that do not permit an order of permanent alimony following an
absolute divorce.
In Taylor, the taxpayer husband appealed from an adverse
29. Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 550-51 (1979). See also
Salapatas v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Campbell,
335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964); Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786, 789
(10th Cir. 1963).
30. See infra Part III of the text.
31. See infra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
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judgment in a suit for a tax refund. The refund suit was based
on the Commissioner's denial of deductions for payments to the
taxpayer's former wife under a property settlement incorporated
in their 1950 divorce decree.3 Under this settlement, which also
divided personal property, the wife was to receive irrevocable
payments of $200 per month until 1954 and thereafter $200 per
month until she died or remarried. 4 The court noted that there
was nothing in the record to indicate that the former wife had
any interest in property beyond that for which she was compen-
sated in the division of the personal property.33 Finding that, one
might reasonably assume, therefore, that the monthly payments
represented fulfillment of a support obligation arising out of the
marital relationship. The Commissioner contended, however, that
because there was no obligation to pay permanent alimony in
Texas, 6 and because the Texas courts would consider these
payments to be permanent alimony, they would not be in
discharge of a legal obligation of support. 7 In essence, the Com-
missioner contended that any obligation of support must spring
from state law in order for payments pursuant to it to be deduc-
tible by the paying spouse.
Referring to the legislative history of sections 71 and 215,38 the
court of appeals rejected the Commissioner's limited view of the
support obligations under section 71. The question, according to
the court, was not whether the obligation arose under state law,
but whether the payments were in lieu of or in the nature of
alimony:
This is not a case in which a spouse is seeking to deduct volun-
tary gratuitous payments. The payments here were hammered
out by attorneys representing the husband and wife as an in-
dispensible preliminary to the divorce proceedings. The vagaries
32. 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964).
33. Parties to a divorce in Texas seeking section 71 treatment must use
property settlement terminology because alimony is against the public policy of
Texas. McBride v. McBride, 256 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
34. 335 F.2d at 844.
35. Id. at 845.
36. Id. (citing Lodge v. Lodge, 368 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)).
37. 335 F.2d at 845. Actually, Texas courts are sympathetic with its
citizens who make their property settlements resemble alimony in order to
qualify payments under section 71. See Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 515 S.W.2d 14
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
38. See supra note 12.
[Vol. 20:173
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of Texas marital law cannot operate to defeat the obvious intent
of the statute that it be uniformly applied. 9
The court thus reversed the district court judgment for the Com-
missioner."
The interpretation of an obligation of support relied upon in
Taylor was established by the Tax Court in Commissioner v.
Hesse." Hesse, which arose under section 22(k) of the 1939 code,
involved a taxpayer who sought to exclude from her income sup-
port payments received from her former husband. She contended
that the payments were not income because the law of Penn-
sylvania, where the divorce decree was granted, did not permit
the ordering of alimony for a spouse who received an absolute
divorce. Referring to the legislative history, the court deter-
mined that Congress intended that there be uniform treatment
of payments in the nature of alimony regardless of differences in
state law. With that established, the court held:
The payments in question here were in the nature of alimony, and
they were in lieu of alimony. Petitioner desired at all times to
receive support from her husband, and the record shows clearly
that the respective agreements of petitioner and [her husband] (on
her part to get an absolute divorce; and, on his part, to execute
an agreement to provide for her support until she might remarry,
with security of various kinds to secure payment to her) were
made in connection with a contemplated divorce, and were made
to take care of the lack of any provision under the law which
would require the payment of alimony to the petitioner if she
sued for and obtained an absolute divorce. 2
The quoted language is particularly interesting in that it
acknowledges that the parties created a right to payments in the
wife in spite of state law. What is most significant, however, is
39. 335 F.2d at 846 (footnote omitted). The court distinguished a case
where a paying spouse was denied a deduction for paying an amount more than
was specified originally in the divorce decree, although the taxpayer later ob-
tained a decree in state court increasing the payments of the original decree
nunc pro tunc to the amount he had actually paid. Id. at 846 n.20. See Van
Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 389 (3d Cir. 1949). The court relied upon
Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948), to refuse to give effect for
tax purposes to the belated state sanction of the payments. 175 F.2d at 390.
This is consistent with the refusal in Taylor to require state sanction when the
agreement is made.
40. 335 F.2d at 846.
41. 7 T.C. 700 (1946).
42. Id. at 704.
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that payments which, on the basis of the evidence are clearly in-
tended as support, are treated as such, for tax purposes
regardless of state law. This was reaffirmed on several occasions
by the Tax Court.43
Unfortunately for tax planning and predictability, there has
been some movement away from the uniformity, embraced by
Taylor and Hesse, for defining support obligations. There are
several relatively recent reported and memorandum Tax Court
decisions in which the court has examined support obligations in-
curred in separation agreements or divorce decrees in light of
state law.
In Knobler v. Commissioner," a divorced wife sought to ex-
clude from her income support payments received from her
former husband. The payments were made pursuant to an order
of the Pennsylvania Quarter Sessions Court, empowered to en-
force quasi-penal support laws," following the issuance of a
criminal information for nonsupport and desertion obtained by
the wife in 1964.46 In 1966, the husband obtained an absolute
divorce, which the Tax Court noted is not usually accompanied
by an award of alimony.47 The husband continued to make sup-
port payments by agreement through 1967, the tax year at issue.
Although the wife continued to accept the payments, which the
court noted were covered by section 71(a)(3),48 the court, without
benefit of a brief on behalf of the taxpayer, determined that her
filing of a petition in the Tax Court was tantamount to a conten-
tion that the husband did not make the payments pursuant to an
obligation of support because such obligation was terminated by
the absolute divorce in 1966."
The Tax Court rejected the contention it deemed the taxpayer
to have made. While conceding that the absolute divorce ter-
minated the jurisdiction of the quarter sessions court,5" the court
43. See Newbury v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 690 (1966); Nathan v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C. 865 (1953); Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 355 (1950); Hogg
v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
44. 59 T.C. 261 (1972).
45. 'Act of March 31, 1860, ch. 427, § 32 Pa. Laws (repealed 1978).
46. 59 T.C. at 262.
47. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Petrosky, 168 Pa. Super. 232, 77 A.2d 647
(1951)).
48. 59 T.C. at 263.
49. Id. at 264.
50. Id. at 262 (citing Heilbron v. Heilbron, 158 Pa. 297, 27 A. 967 (1893)).
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noted that it was well-established that a husband, following an
absolute divorce, must continue to observe the decree until he
has it vacated by the quarter sessions court.5' Because the hus-
band did not seek post-divorce relief from the quarter sessions
court, leaving the original decree in effect, the Tax Court held
that the payments were for the support of the taxpayer." Thus,
it was not the alimony-like quality of the payments or the lack of
relationship to any demonstrable property interest of the wife
that led to characterization of the payments by the husband as
arising under a support obligation. Rather, the payments were
deemed to be support because the paying spouse had not taken
procedural steps under state law to terminate the support
obligation. Such voyages into state law seemingly had been re-
jected in cases such as Taylor and Hesse. Reaching a result that
was appropriate in light of congressional intent as discerned in
Taylor, the Tax Court in Knobler laid a foundation which could
lead it and other courts far afield of Congress's intent with
respect to uniform treatment of alimony-like payments. 3
In Wolman v. Commissioner,54 the Tax Court rejected an at-
tempt by a payor to use Knobler to deduct payments that were
clearly child support. In Wolman, the husband, while the parties
were separated, was ordered by the Family Court of the State of
New York to pay $604 per month to his wife for her support and
for the support of their daughter. He regularly made the
payments from April 1968 until February 1969.1'
On February 20, 1969 the husband was granted a divorce
51. 59 T.C. at 263 (citing Commonwealth v. Cieply, 162 Pa. Super. 346, 57
A.2d 910 (1948)).
52. The court held that the original support decree was within the ambit of
section 71, requiring the recipient to take payments thereunder into income,
because of a congressional purpose "to embrace all support payments made pur-
suant to judicial sanction where the spouses are in fact living apart." 59 T.C. at
263.
53. In support of its assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) posi-
tion was that payments received under support orders of states are deductible
unless and until such orders are vacated or declared invalid, the court included
in its citations Revenue Ruling 58-321, 1958-1 C.B. 35. This is surprising because
that ruling stated that the IRS was not precluded from making its own analysis
of payments under a divorce decree that the Florida Supreme Court had
characterized as a property settlement.
54. 64 T.C. 883 (1975).
55. Id. at 884-85.
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which did not provide for support for his former wife.16 The
decree itself did not provide for support payments for the minor
child, but the husband continued to make payments to his wife
throughout 1969 and 1970, the tax years involved, following the
divorce. These payments were made on what approximated a
monthly basis, but they were usually in an amount substantially
less than the original family court support order.
The Tax Court in Wolman rejected the application of Knobler
to the facts before it. While noting that the divorce decree
superseded the prior support order,57 the court also stressed that
following the divorce decree, the husband "made no attempt to
conform to the prior support order."58 The court viewed the
former wife's receipt of the payments as serving as a conduit for
child support payments. What is significant about Wolman is the
court's analysis of the substance of the payments to determine
whether an obligation of support survived the divorce. Examina-
tion of the payments themselves revealed that they did not
represent support to the wife. The court did not rely solely on
the procedural intricacies of state law to determine whether the
payments were pursuant to a support obligation.
The Knobler approach was followed by the Tax Court in
Schaer v. Commissioner,59 which involved an attempt by a reci-
pient of payments to exclude from gross income eighty percent
of payments received from her former husband after their ab-
solute divorce. The parties, upon their separation in 1973, ex-
ecuted a written separation agreement under which the husband
was to pay "$600 per month for the support of [his wife] and
their children . . ."0 Contemporaneously, the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania entered an order com-
56. The order included a recitation
freeing the [husband] from the obligation [of matrimony] except, and only
except, those obligations owed by him to DANIELLE WOLMAN the infant
child of the parties, and the obligation, if any, of the plaintiff to pay any of
the defendant's counsel fees, with respect to which exceptions decision is
reserved.
Id. at 885.
57. 64 T.C. at 888 (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 380 A.D. 814, 113 N.Y.S.2d
602 (1952), affd, 304 N.Y. 956, 110 N.E.2d 889 (1953) and Sacknoff v. Sacknoff,
203 Misc. 86, 115 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1952)).
58. 64 T.C. at 889.
59. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191 (1979).
60. Id. at 1192.
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pelling the husband to pay the support into the court every
month. In 1976, the same tribunal entered a divorce decree that
did not refer to its earlier support order. 1 The taxpayer's former
husband paid her in accordance with the 1973 order through
1976 and until it was modified by a court order of November 28,
1977.2
The Tax Court determined that the payments prior to the
1977 modification and after the grant of an absolute divorce in
1976 were income to the recipient although, under Pennsylvania
law, the husband's duty to support his former wife was ter-
minated by the absolute divorce. The court emphasized the im-
portance of the husband's failure to have the agreement modified
immediately after the divorce. As in Knobler, the husband's iner-
tia in exercising a procedural right under Pennsylvania law,
rather than the nature of the payments themselves, was seized
upon by the court in determining whether such payments are
pursuant to a legal obligation of support arising from the marital
or family relationship."
The analyses in Knobler and Schaer yielded results that essen-
tially disregarded the state substantive law with respect to
alimony. This is consistent with section 71. To reach such
results, however, the Tax Court analyzed state procedure, an
analysis that seems less than consistent with Congress's inten-
tion that there be uniform treatment of payments representing a
support obligation.
The Knobler analysis was not the sole basis of the decision in
Schaer. The court also rested its decision on section 71(a)(2) of
the Code," which provides that payments under a written
separation agreement made because of a marital or family rela-
61. Id.
62. Id. The modification reduced the original $600 per month to $400 and
provided that these payments represented child support. Id.
63. The court was not impressed by the distinction that in Knobler the
original support order and the divorce decree were entered by different courts,
the quarter sessions and the ,court of common pleas, respectively. While the
same court, the court of common pleas, entered both the support and divorce
decrees in Schaer, the Tax Court determined the earlier support order would
remain in effect, thus providing the legal obligation of support necessary for
section 71, until the paying spouse specifically obtained its modification. Id. at
1193.
64. See supra note 2.
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tionship are includable in the recipient's gross income. The court
determined that because the former husband's obligation to
make payments was contractual, it survived the divorce decree
under Pennsylvania law. 5 In finding a support obligation in the
taxpayer's former husband by determining the viability of the
pre-divorce agreement under state law, the court relied upon a
prior Tax Court decision in Engelhardt v. Commissioner.6
Engelhardt, like Schaer, involved an attempt by a recipient
spouse to exclude payments from her gross income. The tax-
payer and her husband, in 1961, entered into a separation agree-
ment that provided for support payments. This agreement stated
that it would survive any decree of divorce and would be in-
dependent thereof. Later in 1961, the taxpayer and her former
husband obtained a Mexican divorce which provided that the
earlier separation agreement survived the divorce. The separa-
tion agreement provided for a reduction rather than a termina-
tion of payments in the event of the recipient's remarriage. 7 In
1964, the taxpayer remarried and her former husband made
reduced payments as provided in the separation agreement. In
March, 1969, in an action instituted by the taxpayer's former
husband, the Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court held that payments after the wife's remarriage were "con-
sidered as child support and hence were neither income to the
wife nor a deduction from income to the husband."68 The tax-
payer argued that payments she received in 1965, 1966, 1967,
and 1968 were thus not pursuant to any legal obligation of sup-
port to her and were not includible in her income.
The court in Engelhardt decided against the taxpayer for two
reasons: first, it refused to give effect to the nunc pro tunc
recharacterization of the payments by the New Jersey court; 9
and second, it found that the support agreement fell within the
65. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1193 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 216 Pa. Super.
1, 260 A.2d 809 (1969)).
66. 58 T.C. 641 (1972).
67. Id. at 642-43.
68. Id. at 644. See I.R.C. § 71(b) (1976).
69. 58 T.C. at 649 (citing Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d
443 (7th Cir. 1968); Turkoglu v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 552 (1961); Segal v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C. 148 (1961), Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 706
(1947), aff'd, 175 F.2d 389 (3d Cir. 1949), Daine v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 47 (1947),
aff'd, 168 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948)).
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ambit of section 71(a)(2). The court's reliance on section 71(a)(2)
would seem to require a rather tenuous interpretation of the
statute and its legislative history."0 Contrary to Schaer and
Engelhardt, payments after divorce in jurisdictions that do not
permit alimony after an absolute divorce need not be made pur-
suant to a' pre-divorce separation agreement under sectton
71(a)(2) in order to be covered by section 71. If they are intended
and used as support, they are covered by section 71 for divorced
spouses regardless of whether there is any support obligation
under state law. The 1954 revision" was intended to extend
treatment under section 22(k) of the 1939 Code to payments
under separation agreements, not to make payments made under
an agreement more easily deductible than those made pursuant
to a divorce decree. The answer as to whether divorce-related pay-
ments are covered by section 71 is not contained in the laws of the
various states; it is contained in the Internal Revenue Code and its
legislative history. If such payments do not represent a recipient's
property interest then presumptively, if incident to a divorce,
they represent an obligation of support."2 To the extent that the
Tax Court looks to state law in cases such as Knobler, Schaer,
and even Wolman to determine the applicability of section 71,
the court is looking in the wrong place.
B. Payments After Remarriage
A second area where judicial decisions have become plagued
with the niceties of state substantive and procedural law in
determining the presence vel non of a legal obligation of support
70. The statute itself does not purport to cover situations where the par-
ties, after executing a separation agreement, have then obtained a divorce. It
would seem that section 71(a)(1) would apply to that situation. The Senate
Report, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1954), quoted by the court,
does not purport to apply that subsection to payments made after a divorce
decree; neither does the House Report. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A20-21 (1954). Interestingly, both the House and Senate Reports indicate
that payments are covered by the subsection whether or not they are en-
forceable in a court of law. This appears consistent with Congress's intent in
enacting the predecessor of section 71(a)(1) in 1942.
71. Ch. 1, § 71(a)(2), 68A Stat. 19 (1954).
72. Assuming, of course, they do not represent child support, in which case
they are not income to the recipient under I.R.C. § 71(b) or deductible by the
payor under I.R.C. § 215.
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involves continued payment of maintenance or support after a
recipient has remarried. Rigid adherence to state law in such in-
stances, that is, not permitting a deduction by a paying spouse
when state law would terminate any obligation of support, often
results in determinations that payments appearing to be support,
aid which are used for support, are not covered by section 71.
The law of many states terminates alimony upon remarriage of
the recipient.73
Initially, the decisions under section 71 and its predecessor in-
volving alimony-like payments after remarriage did not look to
state law to determine whether such payments were deductible
by the payor or were income to the recipient.74 Unfortunately,
73. See Estate of Kuhns v. Kuhns, 550 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1976); Martin v.
Martin, 267 N.C. App. 506, 216 S.E.2d 456 (1975); Martin v. Martin, 46 Wis. 2d
218, 174 N.W.2d 468 (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(B) (Supp. 1980); CAL.
[CIVIL] CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-20-122 (1973); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1519(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.250(2) (Baldwin Repl. 1979); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1980);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 5(b) (Repl. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (3) (West
Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452, 370 (2) (Vernon 1977); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-208(b)(4) (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.50(5) (1979); N.Y. [DOM. REL.] LAW § 247 (McKinney Supp. 1980); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp.
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 20-109, 110 (Supp.
1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.07.170 (Supp. 1981).
However, the parties may provide otherwise by agreement under the above
authorities in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Virginia and
Washington. In Nevada and Utah the court may decree otherwise.
74. See Hollander v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957). See also
Blate v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 121 (1960). In Blate, the issue of whether sup-
port payments were deductible after remarriage of the recipient was not directly
considered, but the payments were determined to be deductible on the finding
that they constituted support rather than a property settlement.
If the obligation of support is not created by the divorce decree, it must be
incurred by "a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation."
I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976). The most serious problem concerning whether payments
made pursuant to such an obligation incurred by agreement are covered by sec-
tion 71 involves agreements made at some time after the divorce. In such cases
there is a question as to whether the agreement is "incident to" the divorce or
separation.
Determining whether an agreement executed after a divorce is "incident to
such divorce or separation," a statutory prerequisite to deductibility of an
obligation incurred by the paying spouse, may be a difficult inquiry. In Cox v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949), the court held that an agreement
reached eight months after a Florida divorce was not incident to the divorce
Section 71
the Tax Court has increasingly resorted to state law in cases in-
volving payments after remarriage of a recipient to determine
whether a support obligation incurred by agreement incident to
a divorce has validity after remarriage for purposes of section
71. Distinctions drawn in such cases have been rather fine and
not all of the cases can be easily reconciled with each other.
In Brown v. Commissioner,"5 the Service sought to tax to the
taxpayer payments made by her former husband after the tax-
payer had remarried. The court noted that under Virginia law,
the taxpayer's right to alimony ceased upon remarriage."6 The
Commissioner asserted that the enactment of section 22(k) of the
1939 Code was "intended to end distinctions based upon varia-
tions between the laws of different states" and that therefore
the provisions of the divorce decree should control despite the
provisions of Virginia's laws."
The court, however, agreed with the taxpayer that the pay-
ments were taxable only during the existence and continuance of
an obligation to pay alimony. The court held that since there was
no agreement accompanying the divorce upon which the pay-
ments might be based, the payments were not alimony. 8 Later
and, thus, payments to the former spouse were not deductible. The taxpayer
and his former wife had been New Jersey residents. The taxpayer quickly
remarried after the Florida divorce but there apparently was a serious question
whether the Florida court had jurisdiction over the taxpayer's former wife. The
taxpayer agreed to make support payments and the former wife agreed not to
contest the Florida divorce as long as the taxpayer made his payments under
the agreement. The court, in denying deduction for payments pursuant to that
agreement, held that such agreement was not incident to the divorce, but
rather "to preserve his divorce status as to his former wife, and his married
status as to his second wife." 176 F.2d at 230. But cf. Newton v. Pedrick, 212
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954) (opinion of Harlan, J.). In Newton, the court permitted
deduction of payments under an agreement made six years after the taxpayer
and his wife were divorced. This agreement modified an earlier agreement
made in contemplation of their divorce. The court determined that when a later
agreement adjusts an obligation imposed by decree or incurred by agreement
at the time of the divorce, the decree is incident to the divorce.
75. 50 T.C. 865 (1968), affd per curiam, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969).
76. 415 F.2d at 311 (VA. CODE § 20-110 (1950)).
77. 50 T.C. at 867-68.
78. Id. at 869. The court distinguished cases such as Hesse v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T.C. 700 (1946), and Hogg v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 361 (1949), where
agreements to make payments accompanied the divorces. As the court stated:
"We find them all inapposite, for they all involve property settlement
agreements (a written instrument incident to such divorce, i.e., a contract) be-
tween the parties." 50 T.C. at 869 (emphasis added). The use of the term "prop-
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cases have made it clear that even the presence of an agreement
at the time of the divorce will not ensure that payments after
remarriage will fall within section 71.
In Hoffman v. Commissioner," the Service again sought to in-
clude in the taxpayer's income payments she received from her
former spouse after her remarriage. As Virginia law did in
Brown, Illinois law in Hoffman terminated the recipient's right
to alimony upon remarriage." Unlike those in Brown, however,
the payments to the taxpayer in Hoffman were made pursuant to
an agreement entered into with her former husband at the time
of the divorce. Not surprisingly in view of Brown, the Commis-
sioner contended that the agreement "had a separate existence
apart from the decree and that the obligations the agreement im-
posed continued to be binding on the parties after remarriage of
the parties."8' Such a position was consistent with the language of
section 71, noted in Brown, 2 stating that the husband's obligation
may arise "under the decree or under a written instrument.. .. "'I
Although the Tax Court in Brown specifically left open the
question as to whether an obligation of support after remarriage
might be created by agreement,84 and although recognition of
agreements as an alternative source of a legal obligation of sup-
port would diminish the slavish adherence to state law in deter-
erty settlement agreement" can be troublesome. If the payments are actually
compensation for the recipient's property interest, they are not deductible. If
the agreement provides for payments which are indefinite in duration or
amount, they are of the sort that are dependent on the decree for their ex-
istence. To be independent of a decree, payments must generally be fixed in
time and amount. See infra notes 290 & 291 and accompanying text.
If they are fixed in time and amount, and hence, are not dependent on state
law or a court decree for the necessary obligation for support, and their fixed
term is less than ten years, then they would often not be deductible because
they would not be subject to contingencies or modification. See I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)
(1976).
The channel that one must navigate to insure deductibility-steering be-
tween no agreement, which means no obligation for support, and an agreement
which precludes contingencies or modification-is obviously very narrow.
79. 54 T.C. 1607 (1970), affd per curiam, 455 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1972).
80. See 1949 Ill. Laws 729 § 1 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980)).
81. 54 T.C. at 1612.
82. 50 T.C. at 871.
83. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976).
84. 50 T.C. at 869.
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mining tax consequences,85 the court in Hoffman determined that
because the agreement of the parties was incorporated into the
divorce decree, it lost its contractual nature and became part of
the decree."6 The court determined that the obligation was created
by the decree partly because the agreement between the taxpayer
and her former husband provided that it would be applicable only
if a divorce was awarded and the agreement was incorporated in
the divorce. 7 While the agreement clearly was the basis of the
decree, the agreement, according to the court, was no longer the
basis of the legal rights of the parties once it was merged into a
decree.
The court held that under Illinois law there could be no agree-
ment in derogation of the statutory provision requiring a cessation
of alimony payments upon remarriage of the wife. Further, the
Tax Court stated that an Illinois court could not, in a decree,
establish provisions that are contrary to the statute. 9 The only
sort of decree in which the Illinois court could create an obliga-
tion that would survive the remarriage would be a settlement in
lieu of alimony-one ordering lump sum alimony or alimony in
gross, such alimony becoming vested and not terminable or modi-
fiable.90
The decision in Hoffman created much potential for confusion.
Although a holding that alimony is not deductible after remar-
riage in a jurisdiction that terminates a right to alimony upon
remarriage of the recipient would be inconsistent with congres-
85. Indeed the Commissioner plaintively urged that the court, in turning to
state law to determine the tax consequences of divorce-related payments, was
placing "an insurmountable legal and factual burden on the Internal Revenue
Service" because, of the need to keep abreast of the law in 50 jurisdictions. 54
T.C. at 1611. The court gave this argument short shrift: "In view of our discus-
sion above, it is clear that [the IRS] has the burden of knowing the divorce law
of all the States." Id.
It is easy to sympathize with the Commissioner in this case because it had
been "whipsawed." An IRS auditor had previously allowed the taxpayer's
former husband a deduction for the amounts that the Commissioner was at-
tempting to make the taxpayer take into income in Hoffman.
86. 54 T.C. at 1612.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Miller v. Miller, 317 Ill. App. 447, 46 N.E.2d 102 (1943)).
89. 54 T.C. at 1612-13 (citing Balasa v. Balasa, 11 Ill. App. 2d 103, 136
N.E.2d 594 (1956)).
90. 54 T.C. at 1613.
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sional intent, such a holding would provide at least a measure of
certainty. The court in Hoffman did not so hold; rather, its decision
was based on whether, under Illinois law, the parties' agreement
merged with the decree and whether the decree took a form which
created an obligation that survived remarriage. Fortunately,
given the court's analytical predilection, there was precedent in
Illinois on those two issues. At a time when there are many con-
gressional and scholarly drums beating for abolishment of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction and its nettlesome choice of law or
Erie problems,9 it seems strange indeed that federal tribunals
would require such a descent into the morass of state domestic
relations law to resolve this federal taxation question.92
Two Tax Court decisions that have considered the Hoffman
decision, Suarez v. Commissioner," and Sherwood v. Commis-
sioner," have treated Hoffman as holding that only a settlement
in lieu of alimony" will create an obligation which survives
remarriage." Both cases involved divorces granted in Illinois.
In Suarez, in which the Commissioner proceeded alternatively
against both taxpayers who had been parties to a divorce, the
recipient asserted that payments she received were not includ-
ible in her gross income because the duration of the payments
specified in the agreement was only five years. The agreement
provided for 61 monthly payments, 59 in the amount of $500 and
two in the amount of $250, or a total of $30,000. The total amount
specified in the agreement was $60,000, however, which could
have been liquidated by 119 payments of $500 and two in the
amount of $250, or 121 monthly payments from the date of the
91. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Rowe, Abolishing
Diversity Jurisdiction:. Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further
Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979). See also H.R. REP. No. 9622, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1(b) (1978); Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389 and H.R. 9622 Before the Sub-
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1978).
92. In relying on federal rather than state law in a federal gift tax case,
Judge Frank caustically expressed relief: "[W]e are not compelled by Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins ... to play the role of ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of
some particular state; as we understand it, 'federal law,' not 'local law,' is ap-
plicable." Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (citation
and footnote omitted).
93. 68 T.C. 857 (1977).
94. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 660 (1979).
95. Also referred to in Hoffman as lump sum alimony. 54 T.C. at 1613.
96. 68 T.C. at 866; 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 663.
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agreement. The court was guided by the total sum, $60,000, in
concluding that the five-year payment period implied by the
agreement was a mathematical error." In addition to the factual
finding that the payments extended over a period longer than
ten years and, hence, were periodic,98 the court found in the al-
ternative that they were subject to the contingency of reduction
upon the wife's remarriage; therefore, the payments had no
determinable principal sum and thus were not installment pay-
ments." The court summarily concluded that the agreement fell
within the Hoffman exception that a settlement in lieu of
alimony creates an obligation surviving remarriage."O
In light of Hoffman's construction of Illinois law with respect
to the continuation of an obligation to make support payments
after remarriage, the Service should have been required, in
order to make the wife include the payments after her re-
marriage in her income, to demonstrate that they were pursuant
to a settlement in lieu of alimony, that is, one that created an
amount of payments that could not be modified. The court made
no such finding. No attempt was made to reconcile the Suarez
opinion's conclusory finding of a settlement in lieu of alimony
with the contingent nature of the payments under the agreement
of the parties. In Hoffman, payments after remarriage were not
income to the recipient because of their uncertainty. 101 In Suarez,
the payments after remarriage were income to the recipient
because of their uncertainty. Both Hoffman and Suarez cannot be
consistent with Illinois law in that respect.
This confusion was glossed over in Sherwood, which also involv-
ed payments after remarriage to a party to an Illinois divorce. In
Sherwood, which, like Suarez, involved Tax Court petitions by
both parties to the divorce, the recipient wife contended that
payments to her after her remarriage were not income because
they were not in discharge of an obligation imposed on the hus-
band because of the marital or family relationship.'
97. 68 T.C. at 863. The court was reinforced in its belief by a provision that
called for a 25% reduction in remaining payments upon the wife's remarriage
within five years and a 50% reduction upon her remarriage after five years. Id.
98. Id. at 864.
99. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii) (1960).
100. 68 T.C. at 866.
101. See supra text accompanying note 90.
102. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 662.
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The court cited Hoffman,"' but then noted the possibility
under Illinois law that a settlement in lieu of alimony, "to be paid
in installments without regard to either party's death or remar-
riage,"'104 would create an obligation that would survive the recip-
ient's remarriage. Peculiarly enough, the court cited Suarez for
that proposition. In the next sentence, the court held: "In order
to qualify as a settlement in lieu of alimony, the award must,
among other things, be for a definite amount of money payable
over a definite length of time."105 The agreement of the parties in
Sherwood provided that the payments to the wife were to be
reduced in the event of her remarriage. It was because of this
provision that the court decided that the agreement lacked the
definiteness needed to constitute a settlement in lieu of alimony
under Illinois law. 10 6
This holding is difficult to reconcile with Suarez. It is also dif-
ficult to reconcile with the court's alternative holding that even
if Illinois law had provided that alimony obligations could sur-
vive remarriage of the recipient, the court would have found that
the payments constituted an exchange for the wife's interest in
marital property.107 The Tax Court so found, though it could only
speculate as to what property interest was involved, because the
fixed amount of the payments after remarriage prevented them
from resembling support."8 Thus, the payments were too in-
definite in amount to constitute a lump sum settlement in lieu of
alimony, but too definite to constitute support.
Clearly, a comparison of Hoffmen, Suarez, and Sherwood, in-
volving the law of one jurisdiction, demonstrates the difficulty of
determining on the basis of state law the support characteriza-
tion of payments that represent no identifiable interest in prop-
erty.
Unfortunately, it appears that the Commissioner, who saw the
difficulties involved in Brown"9 and resisted this divergence
103. Id. at 663.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Robin v. Robin, 57 Ill. App. 2d 193, 206 N.E.2d 850 (1965);
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 50 Ill. App. 2d 244, 200 N.E.2d 379 (1964); Walters v.
Walters, 341 Ill. App. 561, 94 N.E.2d 726 (1950)).
106. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 663.
107. Id. at 663-64.
108. Id. at 664.
109. See supra note 85.
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from the legislative intent of section 71, has now accepted the
position of the Tax Court that the applicability of section 71 to
payments made after remarriage of the recipient is determined
by reference to state law. In Revenue Ruling 81-8,1"0 the IRS held
that if under state law the payor's obligation to make payments
terminates upon the recipient's remarriage, payments made after
remarriage are not deductible by the payor.
The Commissioner added an interesting twist to the inquiry
however. Relying on the case of Joss v. Commissioner,"' the rul-
ing states that the payments were nonetheless income to the
recipient. This is, of course, one way of dealing with the anomaly
created by payments which do not represent an obligation of
support because of state law and which cannot be tied to any
property interest in the recipient. Such treatment flies in the
face of the obvious symmetry of sections 71 and 215, the latter of
which provides that the husband may deduct only what the wife
must take into income. It is not a matter of logical necessity that
the recipient may exclude any divorce-related payment that the
husband may not deduct. Nevertheless, Joss does not provide
much support for a proposition so apparently contradictory to
the structure of sections 71 and 215.
In Joss, the taxpayer was the third husband of a woman who
received. support from her second husband in a taxable year in
which she filed a joint return as a taxpayer. The taxpayer's wife
received this support under an agreement which provided that
support would terminate upon her remarriage. She did not tell
her second husband about the remarriage and thus continued to
receive support until the second husband learned of her remar-
riage. Because of the joint return, the "support" was income to
the taxpayer if it was income to his wife."'
The taxpayer attempted to rely on Brown"3 in contending that
the support received by his wife was not income. The court held
that if the payments were not support for the recipient or child
support, they were income unless excludable under some other
section of the Code. 4 Finding no donative intent on the part of
110. Rev. Rul. 81-8, 1981-2 I.R.B. 6.
111. 56 T.C. 378 (1971).
112. By the time of trial, the taxpayer, perhaps not surprisingly, was divorced
from the recipient of the support payments. Id. at 380.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
114. 56 T.C. at 384-85.
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the payor, the court held that the payments could not constitute
a gift."' The court concluded, quite appropriately, that the
payments were income to the recipient on the basis of James v.
United States,'16 a case in which the Supreme Court held that
the proceeds of embezzlement were taxable to the embezzler in
the year of the embezzlement. The court held that the taxpayer's
receipt carried with it no stronger obligation to repay than
would be the "obligation of an embezzler to repay the person
from whom he had embezzled.""' 7 Holding that one who has
received money under false pretenses in a divorce context has
received income is a far cry from holding that all payments not
received pursuant to an obligation created by state law and not
attributable to a property interest must be taken into income.
The court did not state whether its holding would be different if
the parties had created an obligation of support by agreement.
The Tax Court's development by reference to state law of a
class of nondeductible support or alimony-like payments and the
Commissioner's responsive creation of nonexcludable payments
constitute a scheme of double taxation outside of section 71, un-
warranted in light of the legislative intent.
IV. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND
PAYMENTS REPRESENTING A PROPERTY INTEREST.
A. The Role of the Separation Agreement in Characterizing
Payments
If the parties to a divorce are so inclined, they may determine
the division of property and even support obligations through an
agreement. Such agreements, at least for purposes of state law,
promote planning and judicial economy. It is not as clear that
such agreements foster certainty and judicial economy for
federal tax purposes. The case law indicates that the courts have
considerable latitude in characterizing payments made pursuant
to an agreement notwithstanding their description in an agree-
ment. Courts ostensibly characterize divorce-related payments as
115. Id. at 385 (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960)). The
court in Brown posited that the payments which were not deductible by the
payor were gifts to the wife. 50 T.C. at 871.
116. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
117. 56 T.C. at 385-86.
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representing support or an interest in property on the basis of
the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the divorce
agreement."8 In that spirit, the form of nomenclature of an
agreement is not permitted to control, absolutely, the tax conse-
quences of payments it provides. Thus, the ability of the parties
to control the tax consequences of a divorce is limited.
The cases indicate that patent attempts to fix tax consequences
of a divorce by mischaracterization of payments in an agreement,
whatever effect such attempts may have for state law purposes,
will not be successful if challenged by the IRS. One of the leading
cases demonstrating the courts' ability to look behind the termin-
ology of divorce agreements is Bardwell v. Commissioner."' In
that case, the agreement between the parties to the divorce pro-
vided for monthly payments to the taxpayer of temporary ali-
mony of $425 for seven months and, thereafter, for monthly pay-
ments in the same amount until she died or remarried. 120 The
agreement also provided that the husband was to place several
life insurance policies in trust for -the benefit of the taxpayer,
and that in the event of the paying spouse's death, the taxpayer
was to receive payments of $600 per month until she died or re-
married. Because the payments would terminate only upon unpre-
dictable contingencies, it was not possible to compute the total
amount of payments. Although the payments of indefinite dura-
tion were in the same amount as the earlier seven payments,
which were designated as temporary alimony, the agreement re-
cited: "[T]hese payments not to be alimony but as part of a prop-
erty settlement."'2 Since the payments were designated as a
property settlement, the recipient omitted them from her gross
income in the tax years at issue."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
rejecting the recipient's reliance upon the terminology of the
agreement, held that the payments were taxable to the recipient.
The court conceded that the courts of Colorado, where the
divorce was granted, might decline to characterize the payments
118. See Bardwell v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 84 (1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 786
(10th Cir. 1963); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924 (1960).
119. 38 T.C. 84 (1962), aff'd 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963).
120. 38 T.C. at 87.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 89.
1982]
Duquesne Law Review
as alimony.12 The court insisted: "[W]e are not, however, bound
by the labels which the parties attach to the payments in their
agreement, especially when its other provisions make it
equivocal, any more than we are bound by the rules of state
law." 124
The description of the facts by the Tax Court discloses that ac-
cording to the husband, the parties described the payments as a
property settlement to foreclose the possibility of subsequent
amendment under Colorado law.125 Unfettered by the terms of
the agreement, the court of appeals examined the circumstances
of the parties in their entirety. It determined that the parties in-
tended that these payments be used for support,126 that the
agreement otherwise disposed of the property of the parties, and
that "there [was] nothing in the record to indicate that the wife
surrendered any property interests or gave up anything other
than her right to alimony in exchange for these payments." 127 In
Bardwell, the Commissioner and the courts cut through the
terminology and characterized the payments on more essential
grounds. 128
It is equally true that characterization of payments as alimony
in a divorce agreement when such payments patently represent
a property settlement will not in itself create a deduction for the
123. 318 F.2d at 789.
124. Id. (citing Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960); Landa v.
Commissioner, 206 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551 (5th
Cir. 1950)).
125. 38 T.C. at 91. The husband also testified that it was the parties inten-
tion that the recipient wife pay federal taxes on all amounts she received. Id.
126. The Tax Court had noted that the taxpayer, in her divorce petition,
had specifically asked for alimony. Id.
127. 318 F.2d at 790.
128. The Commissioner, whose responsibility, after all, is to preserve the
revenue, does not always accept the consequences of the apparent substance of
the transaction. In Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969), the District
Director contended that payments made by the taxpayer to his former wife
were not deductible by the taxpayer merely because they were labeled as a
property settlement. The court, in reversing a summary judgment for the tax-
payer, held that to determine the true nature of the payments it was necessary
to determine the intent of the parties to the agreement. Id. at 1198. Phinney in-
dicates that the IRS is capable of asserting a deficiency consistent with or in
disregard of the terms of a divorce agreement. In either case, the burden is on
the taxpayer, whether he files suit for a refund, see United States v. Anderson,
269 U.S. 422 (1926), or petitions the Tax Court.
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paying spouse. In Coker v. United States,'" the taxpayer's ex-
ecutors sought to overturn the Commissioner's deficiencies for
years in which the taxpayer had deducted payments of $30,000
each to his former spouse. The divorce agreement provided that
the taxpayer was to pay $1000 per month for his divorced wife's
life and that in the year of the divorce, 1960, and the following
year, he was to make payments of $30,000 each year. All pay-
ments provided by the agreement were designated as "perm-
anent alimony."'3 0 As is discussed below, when payments made
at or near the time of the divorce are disproportionately large
with respect to other payments provided in a divorce agreement,
it is quite likely such payments will not be viewed as periodic."'
The district court in Coker indicated that the agreement pro-
vided for payments of $1000 per month indefinitely.' 2 The tax-
payer's executor attempted to buttress the justification for the
deduction of the $30,000 payments by reference to a provision
that would terminate all payments in the event of the death of
the husband or remarriage of the wife.'" The executors argued
that the large payments were contingent, that they did not
represent a principal sum and, thus, were deductible. The
district court held that the contingency provision applied only to
the $1000 payments and that the $30,000 payments therefore
constituted a property settlement. The court so held because the
contingency provision was found in the same section of the
agreement as the $1000 payments and a different section from
the $30,000 payments, and because the contingency provision did
not refer specifically to the section containing the $30,000
payments, while other provisions in the section containing the
$1000 payments did so refer.'"
Such solicitude for determining the parties' true intent from
the agreement must be viewed in contrast to the disregard by
both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit of the clear designation of all payments as
"permanent alimony." It is difficult to quarrel with the refusal by
129. 456 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1972).
130. Id. at 676-77.
131. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
132. 327 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Neb. 1971).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 175-76.
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both courts in Coker to permit the taxpayer to pass off as sup-
port payments the disproportionately large payments by making
them contingent. It is quite clear from Coker that disingenuous
designation of payments as alimony will not guarantee their
deductibility to the payor.
Undoubtedly, the ability of a court to recharacterize divorce
payments can prevent an unrepresented or inadequately repre-
sented party from being overreached on issues of taxation. A
spouse entitled to substantial property from the other spouse
may not be cognizant of the consequences of denoting in-
stallments representing such payments as alimony. In
Karageorgevitch v. Commissioner,35 the parties by the divorce
initially made an agreement dividing their community property.
Among other things, the taxpayer was to receive $386,000 in sav-
ings deposits and other cash assets.13 Just before the divorce
decree was entered, the attorneys of the parties conferred "on
the courthouse steps." The husband, short of cash at the time,
wished to give the wife $55,000 less than the sum to which they
had agreed and to pay it over twenty-one months in payments of
$1500 per month.'37 The amended agreement described these
deferred payments as "maintenance and support."'' 38
Clearly, the deferral of the $55,000 was caused by the hus-
band's shortage of cash rather than the wife's need for support.
The hasty changes in limine were not permitted to rebound to
the husband's advantage tax-wise. The court refused to tax the
payments to the wife on the basis of the "inept" words, "main-
tenance and support."'39 The court relied heavily on the above
circumstances, the absence of contingencies and a provision
stating that the agreement was binding on the heirs and ex-
ecutors of the parties, in determining that the deferred
payments were in the nature of a property settlement. 40 The
135. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003 (1979).
136. Id. at 1004.
137. Id. at 1004-05.
138. Id. at 1005.
139. Id. at 1006. The court noted that the wife's attorney was not a tax
specialist. The Commissioner had assessed deficiencies against both the recip-
ient and the payor, but took a neutral position before the Tax Court. Id. at
1005-06. See also Martin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 255 (1979) (description "addi-
tional alimony" does not control characterization of payments deemed to be in
the nature of a property settlement).
140. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1005-06.
202 [Vol. 20:173
Section 71
ability of the court to reach a just result by looking behind an
agreement, as in Karageorgevitch, should not obscure the fact
that such ability may detract from the potential for predictable
tax consequences of such agreements.
If transparently inaccurate characterization to fix tax conse-
quences of divorce-related payments has been resisted by the
courts, so too has use of strategic ambiguity in agreements, that
is, ambiguous characterization designed to achieve inconsistent,
favorable tax treatment for both parties. For example, an agree-
ment might designate installment payments as a property settle-
ment but provide that they are contingent.'" Such characteriza-
tion would provide some basis for the paying spouse to deduct
and for the recipient to exclude the payments and to argue in
favor of such characterization during an audit of his or her
return."'
In Hoeme v. Commissioner,' the court confronted what it
regarded as an attempt by the taxpayers to shift adverse tax
consequences to each other by leaving the divorce agreement
ambiguous. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the husband
was to pay the wife $25,000 in monthly payments over a period
that exceeded ten years. These payments were not specifically
characterized either as alimony or as a property settlement and
a general paragraph describing the purposes of the agreement
was ambiguous."' In resolving the ambiguity, the court noted the
sensitivity of the parties and their attorneys to tax conse-
141. See, e.g., Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1960).
142. Perhaps calculated ambiguity creates more of an advantage to the
payor, because he or she must have taken the amount paid into his or her gross
income before deducting it. Therefore, the special six-year limitation on
assessments by the Commissioner for substantial omissions from gross income,
see I.R.C. § 6501(e) (Supp. 1978), would not ordinarily be applicable against a
paying spouse. The six-year limitation might often affect adversely recipient
spouses who do not have other substantial sources of income, as amounts er-
roneously excluded would not ordinarily be disclosed anywhere on the return of
such spouse and might easily be detected in an audit.
143. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 880 (1977).
144. Id. at 883. The agreement provided:
[T]his agreement is intended as a fair, just and equitable settlement as to
the property rights of each of the parties hereto and shall constitute a
complete and final settlement of all obligations, rights, claims and duties
of every kind and nature arising out of their marriage relation; shall con-
stitute and be a full and complete settlement as to all claims for all rights
to alimony, support money, property division, attorneys' fees and costs ....
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quences: "Both petitioners wanted to avoid tax liability and have
the other assume it. The agreement was specifically drafted to
leave the nature of the payments (as support or a property set-
tlement) unclear." 4 The court wryly noted: "This was perhaps
unwise because the parties are now presumably incurring addi-
tional legal fees to have the question decided by this Court."'46
Faced with an inconclusive agreement, the court looked to the
facts and circumstances surrounding it. The court found that the
payor did not have a net worth anywhere near the $25,000
payments provided in the agreement. Thus, there was very little
property that could have been the basis of a property settle-
ment. Consequently, the payments were held to represent a sup-
port obligation."7
Realistic and candid consideration of the tax incidents of an
agreement among the parties is probably the most effective
strategy in providing predictable tax consequences. Never-
theless, the inconsistency which the courts have displayed in
evaluating the terminology of a separation agreement as a factor
in characterizing divorce-related payments makes realistic
negotiations difficult. The willingness of the courts to look
behind the form of an agreement has not prevented them from
simply refusing to do so when substantial considerations might
have otherwise warranted it. At times, a form of estoppel has
been applied to prevent the parties to divorce agreements from
impeaching their terms.
In Campbell v. Lake,' 8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court for
the taxpayer. The taxpayer had deducted monthly payments to
his former spouse under a Texas divorce judgment which incor-
porated a contract settlement between the parties. The agree-
ment provided for transfer of real estate and $50,000 cash to the
wife and for 125 monthly payments of $1000. While the distinc-
tion between immediate and deferred payments may have sug-
gested a dichotomy between a property settlement and support,
the agreement itself specified that the payments constituted "the
value of ...one-half of the the community estate and ... the
145. Id. at 883-84.
146. Id. at 885.
147. Id.
148. 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955) (involving the 1939 Code).
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most equitable manner of partitioning [the] community estate
between [the] parties.""9
The district court found the monthly payments to be "periodic
support payments," in spite of the designation of the agreement.
as a settlement of property rights. The court of appeals, in
reversing the judgment below, refused to look behind the agree-
ment or to evaluate the substance of the payments.'50 The tax-
payer contended that the terminology of the agreement repre-
sented an attempt to state that no permanent alimony was being
paid, to avoid contravention of Texas public policy. The court
held that this was without support in the record:
The lawyers representing the parties were highly competent
draftsmen. If they had desired, to say this, they could and would
have said it simply and directly with no beating about the bush.
What they did say was said simply and directly, and there is no
evidence in this record contradicting what they said. It will,
therefore, not do, as appellee undertakes at this late date to do,
to subject the facts and figures used in the settlement and decree
to an analysis, in the nature of higher criticism, designed to read
into and extract from them an entirely different meaning and ef-
fect from that which the parties had in precise terms ascribed to
them."'
The discussion of Lake does not imply an incorrect result
therein. What is remarkable, however, is the implication by the
court that the agreement of the parties is controlling unless
there is evidence of a contrary intention in the record. Clearly,
the proffered testimony of the taxpayer as to the parties' inten-
tion constituted such evidence, whatever its credibility. In view of
the foregoing discussion of case law, it is surprising that the term-
inology of the agreement in Lake should have carried such weight.
Nevertheless, there is substantial authority that would permit a
court to refuse to look behind the terms of an agreement in order
to re-characterize divorce-related payments.1 5 The Tax Court has
149. Id. at 342 n.4.
150. The taxpayer cited Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1950), to
the effect that the terms of the agreement were not conclusive and that parol
evidence might be considered. The court distinguished Greer on the basis that
the payments therein were "clearly intended" to be support payments. 220 F.2d
at 343.
151. 220 F.2d at 343.
152. See Syndes v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 68 T.C.
170 (1977); Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979); Collins v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1979).
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recently indicated a willingness to respect a tax bargain ap-
parently struck by the parties to a divorce agreement. 5 ' The
weight to be accorded to an agreement and, hence, the degree of
incentive to parties to a divorce to say what they mean, is an im-
ponderable. It is perhaps safe to say that an agreement will be
one circumstance among many that the court will consider in
characterizing payments for tax purposes.
If an agreement is ambiguous, the court will make an attempt
to construe it."5 Interpretation of an ambiguous agreement may
be based on the surrounding circumstances discussed above or
on an analysis of the terms of the agreement itself, or both. The
location of a provision in an agreement may play a significant
role in the court's characterization of payments for tax purposes.
In Newbury v. Commissioner,'55 the court was required to deter-
mine the tax effect, inter alia, of monthly payments on a note to
the taxpayer's former spouse. The payment period exceeded ten
years, making them potentially periodic under I.R.C. section
71(c). The court found, however, that because the provision for
these payments was grouped with provisions that more clearly
represented a property settlement, and was apart from a provi-
sion for payments that the court construed as support, the
payments were part of a property settlement and were not
deductible.'
The unexpected prior drafts of an agreement may provide a
basis for interpreting it. In Estate of Thoda v. Commissioner,15 7
the payor sought to deduct payments designated in the divorce
agreement as "alimony in solido." In determining whether or not
the payments represented a property settlement, the court noted
that two prior drafts of the agreement called these payments
alimony and provided that they be terminated upon the occur-
rence of certain contingencies. Because the final agreement
described the payments as alimony in solido, an ambiguous term,
153. See Shane v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1308, 1312 (1980) (terms
of *an agreement are persuasive evidence of the parties' intent, particularly
where the agreement is not structured to take advantage of the tax laws).
154. See Thorsness v. United States, 260 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1958).
155. 46 T.C. 690 (1966).
156. Id. at 697. See also Pierce v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1976).
157. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 880 (1979).
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and provided for no contingencies, the court determined that the
payments represented a property settlement.','
The presence of items specifically designated as support of a
property settlement in an agreement or decree may, by reverse
inference, be used to characterize undesignated items as the op-
posite for tax purposes. If particular payments are designated as
representing the recipient spouse's property interest, then other
undesignated or ambiguously designated payments may be re-
garded as support. Several cases demonstrate this sort of
analysis. In Bardwell v. Commissioner,'59 as indicated earlier,' e°
the court determined that monthly payments specifically desig-
nated as a property settlement were nevertheless deductible by
the payor. A factor in re-characterizing the payments as support
was the presence elsewhere in the agreement of several provi-
sions disposing of the property of the parties."l ' This reasoning is
probably sensible, particularly if the recipient is unable to
demonstrate any particular interest to which the payments are
attributable.
Consistent with this method of characterization is Van Orman
v. Commissioner,'2 where the taxpayer was required by a prop-
erty settlement agreement to pay to his former spouse alimony
varying from $1300 to $900 per month for ten years and one
month. These payments were to cease upon the recipient's re-
marriage. The taxpayer also agreed to purchase a home for his
former spouse. The payments on the new home were not to be
terminated by the recipient's remarriage.'63 The taxpayer sought
to deduct the payments on the home as periodic payments. In
holding that the payments on the home represented a property
settlement rather than a support obligation the court noted the
presence of a provision for support elsewhere in the agreement.'"
158. Id. at 885. Likewise, when a party requests alimony in an initial
pleading, and a provision for payments is not specifically designated as such in
the decree or agreement, the payments may be regarded as a property settle-
ment. See Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921, 929 (1980).
159. 38 T.C. 84 (1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 119-28.
161. 318 F.2d at 790. See also Tracy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 397, 401
(1978); Appling v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 50, 52-53 (1979).
162. 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).
163. Id. at 171.
164. Id.
1982]
Duquesne Law Review
The court also contrasted the requirement of the purchase of the
home with the specifically designated alimony provision by
noting that the former was not contingent while the latter was.1 5
If an agreement expressly applies contingencies to specifically
characterized support payments, a court may refuse to apply
them to undesignated payments.'66
It is clear that characterization of payments in a divorce agree-
ment may provide an important indication of how they will be
treated for tax purposes. Such characterizations, however, have
not been binding on the courts.
B. Characterization of Divorce-Related Payments
in the Absence of or in Spite of Characterization
in an Agreement or Decree
When a divorce agreement or decree does not characterize
some divorce-related payments, or if it does but the court is un-
willing to accept its characterization, the court must examine the
circumstances surrounding the divorce to determine the tax con-
sequences of the payments. In deciding whether payments repre-
sent support or a property interest the courts have considered a
myriad of factors. The decisions involving these factors are not
always easily reconcilable. There has been refreshing consistency
with respect to the tax treatment of disproportionately large
payments which are roughly contemporaneous with the divorce.
Such payments are usually regarded as not deductible by the
payor because they are not regarded as periodic.167 With
payments that are structured such that they could meet the
periodic requirement, it is nonetheless necessary to determine
165. Also important in the court's characterization of the house payments as
a property settlement was the fact that they could be characterized as a lump
sum, a capital transaction "in convenient payments." Id. at 172.
166. See Watkins v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 349, 360 (1969). In Biddle v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1361 (1979), a judgment provided for the taxpayer to
make payments to his former spouse of $200 per month and also to make monthly
payments of $126 per month on their mobile home. When the taxpayer suffered
financial reverses, the parties modified their agreement. The $200 monthly
payments were reduced, but the loan payments were not. The absence of the
contingency with respect to the loan payments, in part, led the court to con-
clude that the loan payments represented a property settlement rather than
support. Id. at 1364-65.
167. See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
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whether they represent a support obligation of the payor or a
property interest of the recipient. When a deduction by the
payor is challenged, he often must prove the nonexistence of a
property interest of the recipient. When exclusion by the reci-
pient is challenged, the recipient must demonstrate the existence
of such a property interest.
In order to demonstrate a property interest to which pay-
ments pertain, it is not always necessary that a recipient point to
an identifiable interest in specific assets. United States v.
Davis,"8 although it did not involve section 71, demonstrates that
a very limited, qualified or inchoate form of ownership may
result in characterization of a divorce-related transfer as a prop-
erty settlement. In Davis, the hsuband transferred 1000 shares
of stock to his wife in connection with their divorce. The Com-
missioner asserted that this was a taxable transaction for the
husband, contending that he had realized gain to the extent of
the difference between the stock's basis and its fair market value
at the time of the transfer."9 Although the stock had been the
husband's separate property before the divorce, he contended
that his transfer of the stock represented a division of property
among co-owners, analogous to a division of property by the
divorcing parties in a community property state. In holding that
the husband had a capital gain on his transfer of the stock, the
Court found, in essence, that he had sold the stock, exchanging it
for extinguishment of his wife's marital rights in his property.' 0
To find the consideration necessary to support a taxable ex-
change the Court relied upon the relatively evanescent rights
which Delaware law provided a spouse in the property of
another spouse. It is clear from the Court's description of such
rights why. it did not regard them as sufficient basis for a divi-
sion of property among co-owners:
[Tihe inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by
the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-
ownership. The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the
management or disposition of her husband's personal property.
Her rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to
share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage she
168. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
169. Id. at 68.
170. Id. at 69-70.
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shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems
"reasonable." 7
'
What is significant about Davis for purposes of section 71 is
that it demonstrates the very limited degree of ownership by the
recipient spouse that will sustain property settlement treatment.
As Davis implies, it is sometimes more difficult for a divorced
spouse receiving payments in a common law property jurisdic-
tion to demonstrate that such payments represent a property in-
terest than it is in a community property jurisdiction.172
If sole or joint ownership of specific assets from among the
cumulative assets of the parties is not required to sustain prop-
erty settlement treatment for a recipient of divorce-related
payments, it is nevertheless true that the parties must possess
assets at the time of the divorce for there to be a property set-
tlement. This may sound simplistic, but the question of whether
payments are attributable to a property interest may arise many
years after a divorce has been entered.' Under such cir-
cumstances it may be quite difficult to determine whether the
parties possessed, jointly or cumulatively, any property that
might have been divided.
If the recipient is to receive an amount in payments which ex-
ceeds the net worth of the parties or is grossly disproportionate
with respect to such net worth, even with respect to interest
over the payment period, it is likely that such payments will be
deemed to pertain to a support obligation. This may be seen in
Hoeme v. Commissioner,174 wherein the husband agreed to make
payments to his former wife in a total amount of $25,000 payable
over a period exceeding ten years."' As noted earlier, these
171. Id. at 70 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531(a) (1953), ch. 221, § 15, 25
Del. Laws (1907) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp.
1980))).
172. For an excellent comparison of the position of taxpayers in common
law and community property states with respect to support payments, see Har-
ris, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments- The "Support"
Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 78-79 (1970).
173. See, e.g., Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Ber-
natschke involved the tax treatment of payments in taxable years 1956 through
1959 under an agreement made in 1940.
174. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 880 (1977). See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying
text.
175. The payments were to be made as follows: $2500 at the time of the
divorce, $200 per month for 30 months and then $150 per month until the
balance was paid, or a total payment period of 141 months. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at
882.
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payments were not identified as representing support or a prop-
erty settlement."' The agreement provided for disposition of
specific items of property. Although the decision rested on
several bases, the Tax Court noted that $25,000 was far greater
than the husband's net worth at the time of the divorce. The
court also observed that for payments to represent a property
interest of the wife, such a property interest must be demon-
strated.177 The court conceded that the monthly payments were
to continue after the wife's death or remarriage and that this
was a strong indication that they represented a property settle-
ment. Nevertheless, the $25,000, even reduced to present value,
could not have represented an interest in the husband's property
or the couple's joint property, and the payments were conse-
quently determined to be support.17
In Derickson v. Commissioner,79 the taxpayer's divorce decree
provided for disposition of several items of real and personal
property to the taxpayer and her husband. It also provided that
the husband make 121 monthly payments to the wife in the total
sum of $83,157.50. These payments were not specifically desig-
nated as support or as a property settlement. The payments
were secured by liens and life insurance proceeds and were not
subject to contingencies. All of these factors suggest that the
payments represent a property settlement. As in Hoeme,
however, the court noted that the principal sum of the payments
far exceeded the net worth of the parties.180 Although the divi-
sion of assets between the parties was unequal, and such an un-
equal division has sometimes resulted in a finding that monthly
payments were intended to equalize the disparity,"1 the court
was persuaded otherwise. Because the amount of the payments
greatly exceeded the parties' net worth, and because the taxpayer
was unable to demonstrate a property interest relinquished in
return for the payments, the court concluded that the payments
constituted support.""2
176. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
177. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 885 (citing Hesse v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 685,
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975)).
178. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 885.
179. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1325 (1976).
180. The net worth of the parties was $48,539; the present value of the
payments was $62,327. Id. at 1328-29.
181. See infra notes 185 & 186 and accompanying text.
182. The court found that the parties did not own a significant amount of
19821
Duquesne Law Review
Clearly, the recipient spouse faces a difficult burden in assert-
ing that payments represent a property settlement when the
parties do not possess assets valued at the amount of the
payments reduced to present value. Correspondingly, a paying
spouse should be readily able to sustain a contention that
payments represent support when the sum of such payments is
much larger than any interest the recipient could have in such
property. In such a situation, however, the paying spouse must
still prove a negative, the absence of a property interest of the
recipient, and, at times, the courts have been imaginative in
hypothesizing such property interests. 8 '
property at the time of their marriage, that the taxpayer had devoted her at-
tention to the care of four children, and that she had acquired no property dur-
ing the marriage from any. source other than her husband 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1329.
183. In Martin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 255 (1979), the husband attempted
to deduct, as periodic payments, two payments of $12,500 designated as "addi-
tional alimony" and payable in the two years after the divorce. Id. at 258. The
husband also was to make monthly payments over 121 months. The wife received
a house in Florida and some personal property. The court found that $7,500 of
each of the $12,500 payments were non-deductible as payments of the wife's
legal- fees. Id. at 261-62 (citing Rose v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 28 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.),
aff'd, 16 T.C. 1418 (1951)). As to the remainder, the court determined that it
represented a property settlement. The court, in so holding, was undaunted by
the absence in the record of any indication of property to which the payments
might correspond. It noted:
The petitioners . . . contend that a support agreement is. indicated by the
fact that the respondent cannot point to any property rights relinquished
by [taxpayer's former wife] in exchange for the two $12,500 payments.
However, as we noted above, the terms of the agreement make it clear
that [taxpayer's former wife] had some property rights that were to be
settled by the agreement. The petitioners bear the burden of proving
their right to alimony deductions.
73 T.C. at 265. See also Hayutin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 449 (1979),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1974). In Hayutin, the Tax Court considered the
husband's contention that monthly payments to his former wife constituted sup-
port. The payments for an earlier taxable year had been allocated as $500 for
support and $200 for the wife's property. See Hayutin v. Commissioner, 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 509 (1972), aff'd, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974). The court, unable to
point to ascertain'able property to justify the continued allocation of $200 to a
property settlement in the taxable years involved, held:
We think it can reasonably be inferred from our prior decision that,
despite the absence of a determination of the dollar amount involved, the
value of the property acquired by [the husband] from [the wife] exceeded
the value of the property transferred by him to her by considerably more
than the relatively insignificant amount of $1400 allocated thereto in the
prior proceeding.
39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 454.
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Assuming that assets subject to division in a property settle-
ment may be identified, it is incumbent upon a party seeking to
exclude payments from her income as representing a property
settlement to establish an interest in such property. As indicated
above, the interest need not be co-ownership, it may be inchoate.
A recipient spouse stands a much better chance of dem-
onstrating a property interest to support an exclusion in com-
munity property jurisdictions because of the rights in the assets
of the community such jurisdictions grant the parties. s4 On the
other hand, if a division of the assets of the community is un-
equal, the payor faces a difficult burden in demonstrating that
the monthly payments are not intended to redress this disparity
and, hence, do not represent nondeductible installments on a
property settlement.'85 Obviously, if in a community property
jurisdiction the recipient can be demonstrated to have received
one-half or more of the community assets, it is then more dif-
ficult for her to demonstrate that such payments represent the
purchase price of her share of the assets allegedly retained by
the payor.88
The presence of a community property interest under state law
may assist a recipient of payments to exclude them as a property
settlement by counteracting an inference that such payments
184. See Harris, supra note 172. This is also true in jurisdictions which,
though they are not, strictly speaking, community property jurisdictions, vest
interests akin to community property states in property acquired jointly during
the marriage. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 125, 130 (1970) (law of
Oklahoma).
185. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357 (1980). In West-
brook, the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer's exclusion from income of $9900 an-
nual payments she received from her former husband. Id. at 1368. The jurisdic-
tion granting the divorce, California, is a community property state, but the
taxpayer was unable to demonstrate the exact value of her interest in the com-
munity property at the time' of the divorce and she had received other prop-
erty, including a car, a home, furnishings, and $11,700 in cash. The IRS contended
that the payments represented support. Testifying for the IRS, the former hus-
band attempted to minimize the value of business property he owned at the
time of the divorce and in which she might have a community property interest.
Id. at 1365. The court found incredible his testimony that the property, worth
$80 million at the time of the Tax Court trial in 1979, was worth only one-tenth
that amount in 1974, the year of the divorce. Id. at 1366. The court noted that
the payments were for a fixed amount, that they were not contingent, and that
the unpaid sum bore interest. The presence of an interest in the wife created
by state law was also deemed important. Id. at 1365. As the court stated, to
bear her burden of proof the taxpayer "need not establish the precise extent of
the community property interest she surrendered." Id. at 1367.
186. See Newbury v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 690, 695 (1966).
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represent a support obligation where they are actually used for
support. If there is a community property interest which must
be liquidated, payments to liquidate it represent a property set-
tlement whether or not the recipient of payments needs support
and uses divorce-related payments for subsistence.187 In a common
law property jurisdiction, the recipient must make a stronger
showing of a property interest.'88
Two cases which clearly illustrate typical analyses of recip-
ients' alleged property interests in common law jurisdictions, but
which are difficult to reconcile, are Bernatschke v. United
States'89 and Wright v. Commissioner.90 Bernatschke was an
unusual case in that the recipient taxpayer did not argue in
favor of complete excludability under section 71. Her former hus-
band, in connection with their divorce in 1940 in Illinois, paid in-
surance companies $647,000 to provide her with an annuity of
$25,000 per year for the rest of her life. The Commissioner
asserted that the entire amount received for the taxable years
involved was income to the recipient. The taxpayer contended
that part of all sums was excludable under the annuity rules of
section 72.191 The annuity rules would be applicable only if the
transfer of property to the insurance companies was viewed as
compensation for the wife's interest in her husband's property or
in the marital property. The transaction could also have been
viewed as a transfer of property in connection with a divorce in
187. See Land v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 675, 683 (1974); Jackson v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 125, 132 (1970).
188. See Salapatas v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1971); Hesse v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 685 (1973); Thompson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 522
(1968); Nathan v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 865 (1953). Nathan, in particular,
demonstrates the burden of proof on a recipient of payments when the Commis-
sioner asserts that the payments represent a legal obligation for support. In
that case, the taxpayer received $17,500 per year in semi-annual installments.
The payments were subject to contingencies and approximated support
payments while the parties were separated. In addition, the taxpayer was
unable to sustain her contention that these payments represented compensation
for an interest in her husband's business. Id. at 871.
189. 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
190. 62 T.C. 377 (1974), aff'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
191. 364 F.2d at 404. Under I.R.C. sections 72(b) and (c), if applicable, the
taxpayer would be able to exclude an amount that bore the same ratio to each
payment that the husband's investment in the contract, $647,000, bore to the
expected return, i.e., $2500 multiplied by the number of years of life expectancy
of the recipient.
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recognition of the husband's support obligation. 9 ' The payments
bore at least a superficial resemblance both to support and to a
property interest; they were to be made until her death but they
were to be made, and were made, after her remarriage. The
Court of Claims, adopting the findings and conclusions of law of
its trial commissioner, determined that the consideration for the
annuities was not paid pursuant to an obligation of support and,
thus, were not fully taxable to the recipient.9 3 The remarkably
amicable circumstances of the taxpayer's divorce in 1940 lent an
unusual degree of inexorability to the court's findings.
The taxpayer's husband was very wealthy and he was deter-
mined to make a generous settlement with his wife. 94 The tax-
payer stated unequivocally that she wanted a lump sum settle-
ment. The taxpayer's husband stated that he wanted to make a
property settlement that approximated the taxpayer's dower in-
terest in his property.'95 An individual who had been a business
adviser to the husband's family for many years suggested to
both parties that the husband should not turn over a large
amount of liquid assets to the taxpayer because of her inex-
perience in business matters.99 Thus, payment was arranged in
the form of annuities by the taxpayer's husband. The taxpayer
granted her former husband quitclaim deeds releasing to him all
rights in property he owned in Massachusetts and Tahiti. In find-
ing a property settlement, the court was not concerned that the
taxpayer did not show specific interest in identifiable assets,
something that might have been very difficult such a long time
after the divorce. The court noted that mathematical exactitude
is not a necessary attribute of a property settlement.'97
The court was heavily influenced by the absence of any discus-
192. Under I.R.C. section 71(d), when such a transfer of property is made,
the husband does not take the income from property into his income; the recip-
ient takes it into her income. See Rev. Rul. 238, 1965-2 C.B. 25. Under I.R.C.
section 215, however, no deduction is permitted the husband for amounts in-
cludable in the wife's income under section 71(d).
193. 364 F.2d at 409.
194. Id. at 406.
195. Under 1939 Ill. Laws Ch. 3 § 18 (repealed 1976), a wife's dower interest
was one-third. Since the husband possessed approximately $2,000,000 worth of
income-producing property, he decided to give her $650,000. 364 F.2d at 406.
196. 364 F.2d at 406.
197. Id. at 407 n.7 (citing Scott v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 257 (D. Or.
1963)).
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sion of alimony or support by either of the parties in the divorce
negotiations. The court also noted that the taxpayer's standard of
living changed drastically after the divorce; there was no attempt
to maintain her in the style to which she was accustomed during
the marriage.'98 The court was impressed by the lack of any at-
tempt by the parties to value the taxpayer's right to receive
alimony,'99 by the right of the taxpayer to designate the
beneficiary of any refunds payable after her death, 00 and by the
inability under the agreement to vary the amount of the pay-
ments according to the needs and means of the parties.20'
The circumstances in Bernatschke, that is, the presence of a
large amount of property, a legal interest in that property under
state law in the recipient, acknowledgement by the other party
of that interest, the absence of a demand for or consideration of
alimony or support, and the fixed nature of payments provides a
useful catalogue of the factors a recipient should adduce in order
to demonstrate that payments are part of a property settlement.
In cases where the paying spouse is attempting to prove that
payments relate to a support obligation, it is useful to prove the
reverse of as many of these factors as possible. In Bernatschke,
the taxpayer had no adversary other than the IRS, as her former
husband had no tax motivation to assert that the payments per-
tained to a support obligation at the time of the divorce, which
preceded enactment of section 22(k) of the 1939 Code, or at the
time of trial.202 Despite its relatively unusual circumstances, Ber-
natschke would serve as a beacon for parties and draftsmen if its
factors were applied consistently.
A significant case that is difficult to reconcile with Bernatschke
is Wright v. Commissioner."' In this case, which involved peti-
tions to the Tax Court by both parties to a divorce granted in
Wisconsin, the husband sought to deduct, and the wife sought to
exclude, monthly payments made pursuant to the divorce judg-
198. Under the court's interpretation of Illinois law, the wife was ehtitled to
be maintained in her lifestyle prior to divorce. 364 F.2d at 408 (citing Walters v.
Walters, 341 Ill. App. 561, 94 N.E.2d 726 (1950), affl'd, 409 Ill. 298, 99 N.E.2d 342
(1951); Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N.E. 820 (1925)).
199. 364 F.2d at 407.
200. Id. at 408. The taxpayer exercised this right in favor of her former hus-
band.
201. Id.
202. The husband would get no deduction under section 215. See supra note
192.
203. 62 T.C. 377 (1974), affl'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
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ment. The payments at issue were to be made over ten and one-
half years and were to total $228,000. As in Bernatschke, the par-
ties, separately or together,, possessed a substantial amount of
property,"4 and the jurisdiction granting the divorce was a com-
mon law property jurisdiction. ' Unlike the divorce agreement in
Bernatschke, the judgment in Wright provided for a transfer of
substantial assets to the wife in addition to later monthly
payments. 06
Following the oral grant of a divorce, the state court, in con-
sidering objections of the husband to the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, considered whether the installment
payments related to a division of property or to a legal obliga-
tion of support. The state court judge found that alimony was to
be denied and that the $228,000 was to be paid "as and for a
complete division of the property of the parties .. .""' It was
also provided that the payments were to be secured by an es-
crow of marketable securities and that in the event of the death
of the husband prior to the payment of $228,000, the balance
was to be paid promptly to the wife. ' Neither party contended
that the award was subject to any contingencies and the Tax
Court later concluded that it was not.0 9
In the Tax Court, the wife relied on Bernatschke and asserted
that the payments represented compensation for her relinquish-
ment of her property rightsunder Wisconsin law.2 1 0 The Tax
Court denigrated these statutory rights as "inchoate," not even
204. Their estate, according to the Tax Court, comprised $1,169,122 in
assets and $104,000 in liabilities. 62 T.C. at 380.
205. Id. at 390 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.26 (West 1957), 1935 Wis. Laws
Ch. 379 (current version at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West Supp. 1981))).
206. 62 T.C. at 383. The wife was to receive $288,000 in assets exclusive of
the present value of the monthly payments.
207. Id. at 384.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 392.
210. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.26 reads in pertinent part:
Upon every divorce from the bond of matrimony . .. the court may finally
divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of the husband
and so much of the estate of the wife as shall have been derived from the
husband, between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any
thereof accordingly, having always due regard to the legal and equitable
rights of each party, the ability of the husband, the special estate of the
wife, the character and situation of the parties and all the circumstances
of the cases ....
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.26 (West 1957), 1935 Wis. Laws ch. 379. See supra note
205.
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remotely reaching "the dignity of co-ownership,"' ' and found
that the payments constituted alimony. It is clear, however, that
the ability of the state court to divide the marital estate accord-
ing to the equities would provide an incentive to a party to set-
tle, granting the other party more property than that in which
the other party has as ascertainable ownership interest. It is dif-
ficult to imagine how the mere expectancy possessed by the wife
in Bernatschke, relied upon by the court therein to find a proper-
ty settlement, could possibly be afforded more dignity than the
rights created under the Wisconsin statute for the wife in
Wright. The state court in Wright was empowered to make a
division of property; it was not limited by considerations of ac-
tual ownership in making such a division and, when the issue of
tax consequences was squarely joined before it, it specified that
the payments represented a property settlement rather than ali-
mony. In Bernatschke, the obvious intent of the parties in an
amicable setting was honored. In Wright, the substance of the
explicit resolution of a contested issue was disregarded. Clearly,
the latter situation commanded as much judicial deference to the
substance of the transaction as the former.
The Tax Court seized upon two bases, neither of which is per-
suasive, to distinguish Bernatschke. First, the court noted that
alimony had not been discussed in the negotiations leading up to
the settlement in Bernatschke."' In Wright, according to the Tax
Court, alimony was considered before and during the divorce
proceedings."' The Tax Court also noted the power of the state
court to provide for both support and a division of the estate.
This should not obscure the divorce court's specific holding that
it was not awarding alimony.
Secondly, the Tax Court determined that the parties had
211. The court cited United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 62 T.C. at
391. The use of Davis to demean the wife's interest in property owned by the
parties is paradoxical. In Davis, the wife's inchoate dower rights were sufficient
consideration to the husband to support a taxable exchange 370 U.S. at 71; yet
in Wright, they were not regarded as consideration for the husband's payments.
62 T.C. at 392. The presence in the law of taxation of such single-edged blades,
cutting only against the taxpayer, can only undermine public confidence in the
administration of the revenue laws. As Justice Douglas once stated: "the
Government in moving against the citizen should also turn square corners."
Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 396 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
212. 62 T.C. at 391.
213. Id. at 392.
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never discussed the inchoate rights of the wife and the negotia-
tions surrounding the divorce.214 Although evidence of negotia-
tions of the parties was important in Bernatschke, it is difficult
to posit that the use or nonuse of terms of art in negotiations
should be a critical distinguishing factor when the state court ex-
plicitly stated that its award represented a property settlement
and when the payments bore such a strong resemblance to a
property settlement. The distinctions employed to evade Ber-
natschke create perhaps a semblance of justification, but they
make prediction of tax consequences very difficult for the par-
ties, the draftsmen, and the judge in a divorce case.21
What is clear-from a comparison of Bernatschke and Wright is
that the absence of an identifiable property interest in the recip-
ient of payments is not a factor that is applied with litmus cer-
tainty in determining whether payments represent support or a
property settlement. Other important factors in differentiating
payments representing support from those representing a prop-
erty settlement have also been applied with unsettling variation
in characterizing divorce-related payments. The overriding cer-
tainty in such cases is the ability of the IRS to place the burden
of proof on whomever it chooses. Indeed, the burden of proof
serves too often as a means of reconciling apparently inconsis-
tent characterization decisions. This is arguably so with at least
214. Id. at 391-92.
215. The wife in Wright later sought amendment of the Wisconsin divorce
judgment in the state courts to increase the amount of payments by $102,840,
the amount of tax on the installments, so that she would receive $228,000 free
and clear of tax. Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 284 N.W.2d 894 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980). The wife argued that if the award was alimony for
tax purposes, it was alimony under Wisconsin law and hence, subject to
modification. The court, noting that the installments were not subject to con-
tingencies, deemed it to be a division of estate and division of property, not
subject to modification. Id. at 263, 284 N.W.2d at 903. The wife also sought
modification on the basis that the judgment was ambiguous and that the
$102,840 was necessary to implement the original intent of the trial court that
the wife not bear the tax consequences of the installments. The court noted
that while the issue of tax liability for the payments was before the trial court,
it adopted proposed findings of the wife which did not explicitly fix tax conse-
quences. The court implied that if the wife wanted the decree to fix the tax con-
sequences of the parties she should have appealed the judgment. Id. at 261, 284
N.W.2d at 900. In view, however, of the certitude of the trial court and later of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court that alimony had not been awarded and that the
payments represented a property settlement, it is difficult to see what the tax-
payer would have appealed.
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three factors used in distinguishing support from a property set-
tlement: (1) the presence and amount of payments pendente lite;
(2) the use of the payments by the recipient for maintenance; and
(3) the presence of a contested claim to ownership of a specific in-
terest in the property of the paying spouse.
1. Similarity to Payments Pendente Lite
It is not at all strange to posit that if support payments have
been established by agreement or decree prior to the entry of a
final divorce decree, undesignated payments which resemble the
earlier support payments are, quite likely, also support. If the
need for and amount of spousal support has been determined prior
to any property division, later payments may easily be regarded
as the continued fulfillment of such need. This was recognized in
Hayutin v. Commissioner,216 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's217 alloca-
tion of payments in the taxable year of $700 per month as $500
for support and $200 for a property settlement.218 The Tax Court
was strongly influenced in fixing the amount of support by an
agreement in which the parties fixed temporary alimony at $500
per month and by the husband's making of such payments."9 The
court rejected the wife's contention that the entire $700 per
month be viewed as a property settlement.
While the court's resolution of the characterization issue in
Hayutin is sensible, such analysis is clearly inconsistent with the
language of the Tax Court in Jackson v. Commissioner:..
Nor are we persuaded that the payments in issue are alimony by
the fact that the petitioner made monthly payments to his wife
during the six years prior to the divorce. That petitioner may
have felt an obligation to support his wife prior to the divorce
does not bear on whether petitioner and his wife had jointly ac-
quired property which was required to be divided between them
on divorce.22'
The inconsistent treatment of the issue by the courts in Hayutin
216. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975).
217. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 509 (1972).
218. The Tax Court subsequently applied this allocation to payments in
later taxable years. See Hayutin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 449 (1979).
219. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 569-70.
220. 54 T.C. 125 (1970).
221. Id. at 132.
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and Jackson is perhaps reconciled by the fact that in each case
the party who bore the burden of proof on the issue lost. The
presence or absence of support payments pendente lite is a
helpful characterization factor and should be applied consistently.
2. Use of Payments by the Recipient as Maintenance
If the demonstrated need for support by a recipient may be
viewed as an indication that such payments represent support,
then use of such payments for maintenance would plausibly sup-
port characterizing the payments as support. In Warnack v.
Commissioner,' the recipient of 121 monthly payments in a total
amount of $257,125 asserted that the payments represented a
property settlement. A strikingly disparate division of other
assets of the estate of the parties 2 1 lent credence to the wife's
contention that the payments were intended to effect an equal
division of the parties' property. The court rejected the wife's
contention, relying in part on her use of the payments as her
sole means of support."4
While use of payments for maintenance provides strong
evidence that such payments represent a support obligation, this
factor has not been applied consistently. In Crouser v. Commis-
sioner," a taxpayer making payments to his former spouse
urged that such payments be viewed as support, in part, because
they were actually used as support. The court found this factor
"unpersuasive. ' ' 8 An important factor in Warnack was virtually
disregarded in Crouser. Again, a common denominator in these
cases was that the party who bore the burden of proof on the
issue lost.
3. Presence of a Claim to an Interest in Property
by the Recipient
In determining whether payments represent a property settle-
ment, it is useful to consider whether the recipient, in the course
222. 71 T.C. 541 (1979).
223. The husband received assets valued at $649,373.42 and the wife received
assets valued at $139,250, exclusive of the monthly payments. Id. at 546.
224. Id. at 553.
225. 73 T.C. 1113 (1980).
226. Id. at 1120 (citing Land v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 675 (1974); Jackson v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 125 (1970)).
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of divorce proceedings, has made any claim to specific property.
In-Pierce v. Commissioner,7 the parties were divorced in a 1964
Nevada action in which no alimony was ordered. In a subsequent
divorce action in New Jersey, the court ordered the wife to pay
the husband $20,000 for shares of stock she had allegedly con-
verted and ordered the husband to pay a lump sum of $20,000 of
"accumulated alimony." 8 No money changed hands as a result of
that portion of the order, but the husband attempted to deduct
the payment. In finding against the husband, the court was
strongly influenced by the fact that the payment was a lump sum
and that it was sandwiched between two property settlement
provisions in the agreement. 29 The court also held, however, that
the payment settled a longstanding dispute as to ownership of
the stock. While the court noted that the payment was designed
to forgive the wife's alleged conversion of the stock, the court
treated ownership of the stock as disputed and viewed the
payments as a resolution of the dispute. Thus, the wife's claim to
the stock, asserted when she transferred it into her own name,
created the property interest that, in part, sustained the property
settlement characterization.2 "
In Thompson v. Commissioner,"3 ' the naked assertion of a
property interest of the recipient in the property of the payor
was insufficient to foreclose characterization of payments as sup-
port. The wife contended that the payments represented her
one-half interest in the stock of a corporation and in real proper-
ty owned by her former husband. The taxpayer had actually
been a tenant-by-the-entirety in the real property before it was
conveyed to the corporation in return for the stock in which she
claimed an interest.32 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the
wife's claim to an interest in property as "a mere allegation in
petitioner's amended complaint in the divorce proceeding." 3 '
Again, the difference between the results in Pierce and
227. 66 T.C. 840 (1976).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 847.
230. Id. at 846-47.
231. 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
232. The payments provided for interest on the unpaid balance, were
secured by a mortgage, and would not terminate on the taxpayer's death or
remarriage. Id. at 526.
233. Id.
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Thompson stems not from application of common principles to
different facts, but from inconsistent application of significant
factors. In both cases the party with the burden of proof, the
taxpayer, was unsuccessful.
The variety of results in decisions characterizing payments
does not facilitate tax planning. Statutory presumptions must be
established for particular types of payments and the factors used
in overcoming such presumptions must be set forth clearly in
regulations. This suggestion is developed in Part V of this article.
V. THE REQUIREMENT THAT PAYMENTS BE PERIODIC
Assuming that divorce-related payments represent an obliga-
tion of support, they must be periodic under section 71 to be
deductible by the payor. As indicated earlier, neither the statute
nor the committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of
1942 define periodic.2" Nevertheless, there are some guidelines
available to draftsmen drawn from cases construing that term.
No case was discovered in which the payor was denied deduc-
tions for payments which were indefinite in duration. This is not
surprising; not only is indefiniteness ostensibly congruent with
the term periodic, it is also antithetical to the notion of a proper-
ty settlement.
Questions as to whether payments are periodic frequently
arise when divorce decrees or agreements provide both for
regular and equal or approximately equal payments of definite or
indefinite duration, and for one or more payments which are
much larger than the others and are made at the same time as or
shortly after the divorce. The courts have tended to treat
payments which are disproportionate to a stream of payments
provided in the same decree or agreement as not periodic.3 5 The
willingness of the courts to segregate disproportionate payments
from other payments pursuant to a decree or agreement has
made it difficult to camouflage payments which represent a prop-
234. See supra note 12.
235. See infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text. Even if such dispropor-
tionate payments are regarded as periodic, if the other payments are for a
definite amount and a definite duration of longer than ten years, the payor's
deduction in any one year is limited to 10% of the total of all payments. I.R.C.
§ 71(c)(2).
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erty settlement by lumping them with periodic support
payments. 36
In Knowles v. United States,37 the divorce decree of the par-
ties provided, inter alia, for monthly payments to the wife of
$300 to be paid until decreed otherwise. The decree also required
the taxpayer to make a lump sum payment of $25,000 to the
wife. The denial by the Commissioner of the taxpayer's deduc-
tion of the $25,000 payment was the basis of the taxpayer's re-
fund suit. The court held that the term "periodic" excluded a
lump sum installment payment, relying on the ordinary meaning
of the term "periodic.""2 8
The Knowles decision was relied on in Pierce v. Commis-
sioner,239 to equate a lump sum payment with a property settle-
ment. In Pierce, as discussed earlier, 4 ' the taxpayer liquidated a
$20,000 claim for "accumulated alimony" fixed by the divorce
decree by forgiving a claim against his wife for her alleged con-
version of stock valued in the same amount. The decree also pro-
vided for weekly support payments to the wife until further
order of the court. The court, in denying a deduction for the
$20,000 payment, held that resort by the parties to the lump sum
form of payment is a strong indication that the payment
represents a property settlement. 4' Again, the disproportionate
payment was not regarded as one of the periodic payments con-
tained in the agreement.
Whether a large payment made shortly after the decree is
viewed as a property settlement or simply as not periodic in a
common sense meaning of the term, such a result is not difficult
to justify if the payment is greatly disproportionate to regular
monthly or weekly payments provided elsewhere in a decree or
agreement. Such segregation becomes more tenuous in other cir-
cumstances. In Houston v. Commissioner,242 the divorce decree
provided in part that the husband was to pay the wife $115,000
236. See Bernstein v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1980).
237. 182 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Miss. 1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1961).
238. 182 F. Supp. at 154 (citing Norton v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1216, aff'd,
192 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1951)).
239. 66 T.C. 840 (1976).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 227 & 228.
241. 66 T.C. at 847 (citing Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955),
and Land v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 675 (1974)).
242. 442 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971).
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in cash within one month of the decree and then $25,000 per year
commencing more than one year after the divorce decree. While
the $115,000 is disproportionate with respect to the $25,000 an-
nual payments, which were determined by the Tax Court to
possess support characteristics, 4 ' the annual payments were
larger and less frequent than support payments generally. Thus,
the basis for the segregation is not completely obvious. The
language of the court should serve as a clear warning to drafts-
men, however: "Where there is a substantial payment, such as
this, which comes soon after the entry of the divorce decree, we
think it not unreasonable to conclude that a property settlement
was intended."
Disproportionate payments in amounts smaller than those in-
volved in Knowles, Pierce, and Houston have been regarded as
nondeductible by the payor. In Norton v. Commissioner,45 the
Tax Court refused to treat a payment of $5,000 "additional
alimony" as one of a series of periodic payments when the other
payments were $200 per month." While the Tax Court has
recently observed that the fact that a payment is larger than
other payments does not, in itself, prevent such a payment from
qualifying as periodic," disproportionately large payments at the
time of the divorce or shortly thereafter appear to be a poor idea
tax-wise for the paying spouse. Likewise, the transfer of proper-
ty other than money, such as a home, 48 or making a down pay-
ment on a home,2' 9 are not likely to be regarded as periodic.
The unwillingness of the courts to treat large lump sums as
periodic payments has not been limited to payments made at or
near the time of the entry of the decree. Lump sum payments in
consideration for liquidation of an obligation to make periodic
243. See Schwab v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 815, 818 (1969).
244. 442 F.2d at 42.
245. 16 T.C. 1216, aff'd, 192 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1951).
246. See also Commissioner v. Goff, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 654 (1964). In Goff, hus-
band was denied a deduction for cancelling a $2500 debt. The cancellation was
not treated as one of the periodic payments when such other payments were
$100 per month. Id. at 659.
247. Miller v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 714, 716 (1981) (citing Thomp-
son v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 522 (1968), and Porter v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 448 (1966), affd mem., 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968)).
248. See Miller v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 715 (1981).
249. See Lounsbury v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1963).
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payments, 5 ' and lump sum payments on the recipient's remar-
riage"' have been held not to be °periodic. Lump sum
prepayments of alimony have not been regarded as periodic.252
One exception has been carved out for lump sum payments of ar-
rearages in periodic payments. Such lump sum payments retain
the characterization of the original payments.2" Thus, while the
reasoning of cases construing the "periodic" requirement of sec-
tion 71(a) may be disputed in some instances, the cases are fairly
consistent and their message easily discernible.
A. "Deemed" Periodic Payments Under Section 71(c)(2)
As noted earlier, payments representing installments on a
principal sum are not regarded as "periodic" under section
71(c)(1). 2 5 Under section 71(c)(2), however, if the payment period
of the principal sum is more than ten years from the date of the
decree or agreement, the payments are treated as periodic.
There is no explicit indication in the legislative history of the
Revenue Act of 1942 why payments on a principal sum payable
over a period exceeding ten years are given the same tax treat-
ment as indefinite payments under section 71(a).255 There is also
no indication why payments on a principal sum payable over a
period of less than ten years are not periodic payments.
Alimony or support that is limited in amount and duration is
250. See Ashcraft v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1958).
251. See Commissioner v. Senter, 242 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1957); Hardy v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 857 (1973).
252. See, e.g., Capiaux v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-1 79-3791) (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
253. See Capodanno v. Commissioner 602 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1979).
254. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
255. In the Senate proposal for the Revenue Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 687, (1941)
no installments on a principal sum were deductible by the payor. See S. REP.
No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1942). Strangely enough, the House of
Representatives' original version of the 1942 legislation provided that install-
ment payments were treated as periodic payments: "If the amount thereof is 10
per centum or more of such principal sum or if such principal sum is required,
by the terms of the decree or instrument, to be paid within a period ending not
more than 10 years from the date of such decree or instrument." H.R. 7378,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 117 (1942) (emphasis added). The Senate Finance Commit-
tee amended this to provide that the principal sum must be paid over a period
longer than ten years for installments thereon to be considered periodic. S.
REP. 1683, supra note 12, at 84-85. The House acquiesced. H.R. REP. No. 2586,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1942) (conference report).
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commonly called "alimony in gross" or "lump sum alimony.1 256
Alimony in gross represents a trade-off between the parties. The
amount of the paying spouse's obligation is final and non-
modifiable, but it terminates at a date certain. It is not entirely
unreasonable to speculate that the drafters of section 22(k) of the
1939 Code desired to impose a similar trade-off for tax purposes
when the parties reduced the obligation to a gross or lump sum;
a payor who limits the duration of his obligation must make
payments over a period exceeding ten years or the payments
will not be deductible.
As discussed earlier, the ability to shift income from the gran-
tor to the recipient of an alimony trust was the only divorce-
related tax benefit available prior to the Revenue Act of 1942.25 '
A significant problem was that this benefit was not uniformly
available. It was most likely to be permitted where, under local
law, the divorce decree or agreement fixed the grantor's obliga-
tion such that it was not a continuing legal obligation subject to
modification."'
In providing for the deductibility of payments made pursuant
to a support obligation, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1942,
swept aside one of the underpinnings of Douglas v. Willcuts,5 9
that the use of income to fulfill a legal obligation should result in
taxation to the individual whose obligation was fulfilled.60 It is
not surprising, in that spirit, that alimony in gross, which is used
to discharge a spouse's support obligation and forestall modifica-
tion,2"" should have been accompanied by a requirement that it be
paid over a period exceeding ten years to be deductible by the
payor. The ten-year demarcation, in view of the rejection of a
256. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 447 (1968).
257. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
258. See Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(1930); Raum, Taxability of the Grantor Alimony and Similar Trusts, 10 U. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 25, 38 (1941).
259. 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
260. See Old Colony Trust & Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929)
(employer's payment of employee's taxes held to be income to employee).
261. The role of alimony in gross in foreclosing modification by fixing a cer-
tain amount and the duration of payments has been noted in federal tax cases.
See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377, 394 (1974), aff'd, 543 F.2d 593,
599 (7th Cir. 1976); Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1960);
Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924, 930 (1960).
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provision that would have provided periodic treatment for in-
stallments on principal sums payable in ten years or less,262
evidences a fairly clear legislative intent that a recipient of sup-
port payments should benefit tax-wise if she consents to a fixed
sum of payments terminating within ten years.
Despite this clear line apparently drawn for specific alimony
obligations, the federal appellate courts 263 and then the Treasury
Department, through regulations, 64 have determined that if
payments of a fixed amount and duration less than ten years
may be terminated by the death of either spouse, remarriage of
the recipient, or other contingency,26 or may be modified, the
payments are income to the recipient and deductible by the
payor. This seems incongruous in light of the apparent trade-off
in section 71(c)(1) and (2), because the termination on the occur-
262. See supra note 255.
263. See Fidler v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1956); Prewitt v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1955); Davidson v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d
147 (9th Cir. 1955); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953);
Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
264. In particular, Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1957) states:
(i) Where payments under a decree, instrument, or agreement are to be
paid over a period ending ten years or less from the date of such decree,
instrument, or agreement, such payments are not installment payments
discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, in terms
of money or property, specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement
and are considered periodic payments for the purposes of section 71(a) only
if such payments meet the following two conditions:
(a) Such payments are subject to any one or more of the contingencies
of death of either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the
economic status of either spouse, and
(b) Such payments are in the nature of alimony or an allowance for
support.
(ii) Payments meeting the requirements of subdivision (i) are considered
periodic payments for the purposes of section 71(a) regardless of whether-
(a) The contingencies described in subdivision (i)(a) of this sub-
paragraph are set forth in the terms of the decree, instrument, or agree-
ment, or are imposed by local law, or
(b) The aggregate amount of the payments to be made in the absence
of the occurrence of the contingencies described in subdivision (i)(a) of this
subparagraph is explicitly stated in the decree, instrument, or agreement
or may be calculated from the face of the decree, instrument, or agree-
ment, or
(c) The total amount which will be paid may be calculated actuarially.
Id.
265. One of the more unusual contingencies is provided by New York law,
which suspends payment of alimony during imprisonment of the payor. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 247 (McKinney.Supp. 1980).
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rence of a contingency can only reduce an obligation which is
alre(ady payable over too short a time to be deductible.266 The
determination in the leading case, Baker v. Commissioner,267 and
its progeny, that such payments are periodic, was predicated on
the unpredictability of the amount to be paid. Since payments
can be terminated, there is no principal sum. As the court in
Baker stated: "[The computation seems as far beyond the reach
of an educated guess as what will be the first name of the man
or woman who will become President of the United States in
1983."'26" What is certain, however, is that the payments in Baker
and related cases would terminate within ten years. At this
stage, however, any argument with the result in cases such as
Baker is futile, as the regulations have embraced the Baker rule
and have been held to be consistent with the Internal Revenue
Code.6 9
The possibility that the presence of contingencies may render
payments taxable to the recipient, even if the agreement termin-
ates such payments within ten years or less, must be reckoned
with in drafting divorce agreements. It can produce unantici-
pated tax results because the contingencies may be implied by
state law, whether or not they are in the agreement. 70 Most
states provide for termination of alimony upon certain condi-
tions, or for modification of divorce-related payments under cer-
266. The treating as periodic of payments of fixed duration of less than ten
years but subject to contingencies was rejected steadfastly by the Tax Court
prior to the decision of the second circuit in Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d
369 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Fleming v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1380 (1950); Estate
of Orsatti v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 188 (1949); Steinel v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.
409 (1948). The consistent position of the court with the greatest amount of tax
expertise should probably have been given more deference by the federal
courts of appeals. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
267. 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
268. Id. at 370.
269. See Salapatas v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1971). Interestingly,
in at least one of the cases that accepted the reasoning of Baker, the court
seemed more concerned with uniformity than with a correct result. Comment-
ing on Baker, Smith's Estate, Myers and Davidson, the court in Prewitt v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1955) said: "So far as possible, and par-
ticularly with respect to questions of federal taxation, there should be uniformity
of decision amoung the circuits. Unless we were convinced that we could
demonstrate that cases we have referred to were incorrectly decided, we would
not be justified in refusing to follow them." Id. at 252.
270. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii)(a) (1957). See supra note 264.
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tain circumstances by statute or judicial decision." In most
states, however, these contingencies do not apply to all divorce-
related payments that may be imposed by decree or incurred by
agreement. The parties to a divorce, in order to determine its
tax consequences, must examine not only whether state law pro-
vides contingencies, but also whether the agreement or decree
takes a form to which the contingencies apply. If the decree or
agreement takes such a form, the payments are periodic.
In Stock v. Commissioner,2 the parties' agreement provided,
271. See Dubose v. Dubose, 275 Ala. 220, 153 So. 2d 778 (1963); Bulloch v.
Bulloch, 21 Ohio App. 2d 10, 255 N.E.2d 299 (1969); Moore v. Moore, 89 Wis. 2d
665, 278 N.W.2d 881 (1979). ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.220 (1973); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-327 (Supp. 1981-82); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1213 (Cum. Supp. 1979); CAL.
[CIV.] CODE § 4801(b), (c) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-122 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-86 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
1519 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-204
(1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-51 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 32-709 (Com. Supp.
1981); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 510(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.21(8) (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.250(1) (Baldwin 1979); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp.
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 5 (1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208 § 37 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
552.28 (Cum. Supp. 1981-82); MINN. STAT. ANN § 518.64 (West Supp. 1982); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.370 (Vernon 1977);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b), (7) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:32 (1968);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(2)
(1978); N.Y. [DOM. REL.] LAW § 236. Part B(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.135(1)(a) (1979) (amended 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(e) (Purdon Supp.
1981-82); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Cum. Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170
(Cum. Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-41 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-820(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 758 (1974); VA. CODE § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.07.170 (Supp. 1981); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-116 (1977).
Three states do not fit this pattern. In Indiana and Texas alimony may not be
awarded. See Savage v. Savage, __ Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978), and
Lodge v. Lodge, 368 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). In both jurisdictions there
may be property settlements which are paid in installments, but in neither
jurisdiction does it appear that such installments would terminate automatically
upon certain contingencies. See Firestone v. Firestone, 567 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-10(c) (Burns 1980).
In Oklahoma, under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1278 (Supp. 1980), the court
may not make an indefinite support order absent agreement of the parties. An
agreement of definite amount and duration may be made terminable upon the
death of either spouse or the remarriage of the recipient. May v. May, 596 P.2d
536 (Okla. 1979).
272. 551 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1977).
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inter alia, that "as further alimony" the husband was to pay the
wife a total sum of $25,519.07 over five yearsY Although the
payment period was less than ten years, the husband argued
that they were periodic because the law of Georgia, where the
divorce was granted, made such payments contingent upon the
death or remarriage of the wife or a change in the economic cir-
cumstances of the husband."' The court held, however, that the
Georgia courts did not impose the statutory contingencies27 5 on
awards of a fixed or lump sum.27 The inability of the taxpayer to
demonstrate that the payments might terminate within the
stated period under state law resulted in his failure to meet the
periodic requirement as amplified by the regulations.
Familiarity not only with statutory provisions, but also with
case law, if it is available, is essential to enable counsel to draft a
divorce agreement. Deciphering a maze of state decisions, how-
ever, can be difficult, as the years since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"
have demonstrated in another context. Several taxpayers in re-
cent years have discovered that the state law contingencies on
which they relied to meet the periodic requirement did not apply
to their decrees. "8 In providing for reference to state law, the
regulations under section 71(c)(2) have the ironic by-product of
giving tax effect to state policies with respect to alimony in
gross while ignoring the ten-year demarcation specified by Con-
gress.
Reference to state law is also questionable in light of the
uniformity sought by Congress in the Revenue Act of 1942,
because the variation among the states with respect to con-
273. Id. at 615-16 n.1.
274. Id. at 618.
275. See supra note 271.
276. 551 F.2d at 618 (citing Morris v. Padgett, 233 Ga. 750, 213 S.E. 2d 647
(1975); Herbert v. Huggins, 231 Ga. 489, 202 S.E. 2d 443 (1973); Eastland v.
Candler, 226 Ga. 588, 176 S.E. 2d 89 (1970)).
277. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
278. See Crouser v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1113 (1980) (Ohio law), appeal
pending; Tracy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 397 (1978) (Mississippi law); Adams v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 830 (1976) (Oklahoma law); Ellis v. Commissioner, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) 267 (1980) (Georgia law); Collins v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH)
757 (1979) (North Carolina law); Biddle v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1361
(1979) (Georgia law).
In Guiberson v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-455 (D. Kan. 1978),
although the court determined that it was not bound by state law in questions
under section 71, it held payments to be periodic because of a contingency sup-
plied by Kansas law. Id. at 79-459 to 79-460.
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tingencies and alimony in gross is considerable. Many states pro-
vide that a divorce court may fix alimony or support in a certain
amount and for a certain duration, that is, alimony in gross." In
two jurisdictions, Louisiana and West Virginia, cases addressing
the availability vel non of alimony in gross are so old that it is
difficult to determine whether it may be ordered. 2" Although
many of the jurisdictions that permit alimony in gross or lump
sum alimony provide that it may not be modified, 8' there appear
to be at least three jurisdictions in which alimony in gross may
be modified.282 While some jurisdictions have held that alimony in
gross is not terminable upon contingencies such as the death of
279. See Ex Parte Thompson, 282 Ala. 248, 210 So. 2d 808 (1968); Lindsay v.
Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 565 P.2d 199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of
Cohen, 610 P.2d 1092 (Col. Ct. App. 1980); Pulvermacher v. Pulvermacher, 166
Conn. 380, 349 A.2d 836 (1974); Hamilton v. Finch, 238 Ga. 78, 230 S.E.2d 881.
(1976); In re Marriage of Preston, 81 Ill. App. 2d 672, 402 N.E.2d 332 (1980); In
re Marrige of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 1973); Grundy v. Grundy, 4
Kan. App. 2d 302, 605 P.2d 162 (1980); Kahn v. Kahn, 353 Mass. 771, 233 N.E.2d
902 (1968); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 379 So. 2d 314 (Miss. 1980); D - E
W __ v. M __ W __ 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. 1977); Van Pelt v.
Van Pelt, 206 Neb. 350, 292 N.W.2d 917 (1980); Holt v. Holt, 84 S.D. 671, 176
N.W.2d 51 (1970); Spalding v. Spalding, 597 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (3) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp.
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 721 (1981); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
552.23 (Supp. 1982-82); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(1)(a) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-16.7 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105
(c) (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
As noted, Oklahoma requires that alimony awards be ordered for a definite
time. See supra note 271. Maryland requires that support awards be for a
limited time, which may be extended. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 1(c) (1981). New
Hampshire limits alimony awards to three years, although such awards may be
renewed. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (Supp. 1981).
280. See Scott v. Scott, 197 La. 726, 2 So.2d 193 (1941) (probably no); Tuning
v. Tuning, 90 W. Va. 457, 111 S.E. 139 (1922) (yes).
281. See Ex Parte Hartsfield, 384 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Lloyd v.
Lloyd, 23 Ariz. App. 376, 533 P.2d 684 (1975); In re Mariage of Cohen, 610 P.2d
1092 (Colo. App. 1980); Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1979); Taulbee v.
Taulbee, 243 Ga. 52, 252 S.E.2d 481 (1979); Oknaian v. Oknaian, 90 Mich. App.
28, 282 N.W.2d 230 (1979); Butler v. Hinson, 286 So. 2d 716 (Miss. 1980); Whit-
worth v. Whitworth, 559 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App. 1977); Popovic v. Popovic, 45
Ohio App. 2d 57, 341 N.E.2d 341 (1975); Blakely v. Blakely, 249 S.C. 623, 155
S.E.2d 857 (1967); Holt v. Holt, 84 S.D. 671, 176 N.W.2d 51 (1970); Spalding v.
Spalding, 597 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. App. 1980).
282. See In re Marriage of Preston, 81 Ill. App. 3d 672, 402 N.E.2d 332
(1980); Grundy v. Grundy, 4 Kan. App. 2d 302, 605 P.2d 162 (1980); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 721 (1981).
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either party or the recipient's remarriage,283 others have held
that it may be terminable.284
According to Stock and similar cases," 5 when alimony in gross
is awarded in a jurisdiction in which the awards may be neither
modified upon changed conditions nor terminated upon the occur-
rence of contingencies, and the award is for ten years or less, the
payments under such an award are not periodic. There are many
jurisdictions that have not decided clearly whether alimony in
gross is modifiable or terminable.286 In such jurisdictions, a
federal court attempting to decide whether divorce-related
payments ordered for ten years or less are periodic would be
forced to decide without the guidance of local law.28 7
Section 71 does not require that payments be ordered by a
court in order to be deemed periodic; the obligation to make such
payments may be incurred by agreement.2 8 If payments under
an obligation incurred by agreement are subject to contingencies
under state law, they are periodic. 88 State decisions vary widely
as to whether fixed alimony obligations incurred in an agreement
may be modified or terminated. Some states hold that such
payments may not be modified.' 9 Others hold that an agreed sum
may be modified if it is merged into or approved by a decree.291
283. See Viglione v. Viglione, 171 Conn. 213, 368 A.2d 202 (1976); Newell v.
Newell, 237 Ga. 708, 229 S.E.2d 449 (1976); Kishner v. Kishner, 93 Nev. 220, 562
P.2d 493 (1977).
284. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 565 P.2d 199 (1977); In re Mar-
riage of Preston, 81 Ill. App. 3d 672, 402 N.E.2d 332 (1970); Martin v. Martin, 26
N.C. App. 506, 216 S.E.2d 456 (1975); May v. May, 596 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1979).
285. See supra note 278.
286. See supra the cases cited in notes 279-284.
287. Recognizing the variety of views as to whether alimony in gross is
modifiable or terminable, it seems unsatisfactory and intrusive for a federal
court to resort to legal encyclopedias or A.L.R. annotations in search of a
general rule.
288. I.R.C. § 71(a). See supra note 2.
289. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1956).
290. See Richardson v. Richardson, 3 Kan. App. 610, 599 P.2d 320 (1979);
Keltner v. Keltner, 589 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1979); Lawton v. Lawton, 113 N.H. 429,
309 A.2d 150 (1973); VA. CODE § 20-109 (1975).
291. See Lively v. Lively, 222 Ark. 501, 261 S.W.2d 409 (1953); Phillips v.
Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d 49 (1969); Scott v. Scott, 529 S.W.2d 656 (Ky.
1975); Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976) (contempt power
may be removed although contractual obligation remains); White v. White, 296
N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979); Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464 (N.D. 1976)
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Still other jurisdictions permit modification of an agreed sum on
the same basis as modification of final judgments generally, for
reasons such as fraud, duress, or mistake at the time of the
agreement. 2
Some contingencies that will permit modification of an agreed
sum are more idiosyncratic. Alabama permits modification for
clear and sufficient reasons;. 3 Iowa does so only upon a showing
of positive wrong or injustice;294 Colorado permits modification
when an agreement becomes unconscionable on the basis of
changed circumstances;95 New York will permit modification only
when the recipient is in danger of becoming a public charge;"8
and Indiana and Kansas permit modification where the parties
agree. 9 A number of jurisdictions permit amendment of an
agreed sum unless there is an agreement to the contrary.298
Would payments under an agreement extending ten years or
less be periodic on the basis that they might be modifiable if the
agreement became unconscionable, or if the recipient became a
public charge, or if the parties could agree to modify the agree-
ment? As unlikely as these contingencies may be in some cir-
cumstances, it would seem that they would make agreed alimony
payments periodic.
As with alimony in gross or lump sum alimony, it is clear that
not all of the legislatures have stated clearly whether alimony
based upon agreement may be modified. Thus, the IRS and tax-
payers are faced not only with a myriad of views among states
(but court should be reluctant to allow modification); Marriage of Vaughn, 25
Or. App. 655, 550 P.2d 1243 (1976); Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D.
1978); Corbin v. Corbin, 157 W. Va. 967, 1 206 S.E.2d 868 (1974).
292. See Davis v. Davis, 268 A.2d 515 (D.C. 1970); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 21 Ohio
Supp. 2d 76, 255 N.E.2d 299 (1969); Grimshaw v. Grimshaw, 581 P.2d 1329 (Okla.
1978); IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-1-11.5-17 (Burns 1980).
293. See Taylor v. Taylor, 369 So. 2d 1240 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 369 So. 2d 1243 (1979).
294. See Ellis v. Ellis, 262 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1978).
295. See In re Marriage of Cohen, 610 P.2d 1092 (Colo. 1980) (except where
agreement precludes modification).
296. See Goldman v. Goldman, 69 A.D.2d 758, 415 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1979).
297. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-10(a) (Burns 1980). KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1610(e) (1980).
298. See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 161 Cal. Rptr. 272
(1980); Watters v. Foreman, 204 Neb. 670, 284 N.W.2d 850 (1979); Marriage of
Olsen, 24 Wash. App. 292, 600 P.2d 690 (1979); Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45
(W. Va. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180(6) (Baldwin 1979); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 16 § 28 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 48-320(6) (Supp. 1977).
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which have addressed the issue, but also with unanswered ques-
tions in jurisdictions which have not addressed the issue. This
creates administrative difficulty, difficulty in planning, and a
diversity of possible outcomes, which is at variance with the
Revenue Act of 1942. The doctrine of the Baker case, as em-
bodied in the regulations, should be rejected by statute.
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED CHANGES IN SECTION 71
Section 71 is unsatisfactory in many respects: increasingly
slavish reference to state law as to what constitutes a support
obligation and whether payments are periodic creates confusion
and frustrates uniform administration of the tax law. The strug-
gle to articulate substantive factors to differentiate between
payments representing a support obligation of the payor and
those representing a property interest of the recipient has
generated a maze of factors too complex to be applied consistent-
ly or predictably. The burden of this complexity falls heaviest on
the taxpayer, who, after all, bears the burden of proof in most in-
stances.
The creation of presumptions for divorce-related payments
would be preferable to the current structure of section 71. '
Divorce-related payments made prior to the divorce or agree-
ment should be presumed to be support. Payments in the year of
the divorce decree or agreement should be presumed to repre-
sent a property interest of the recipient unless otherwise
stipulated. Payments made later than the year of the decree or
agreement should be presumed to represent a support obligation
and, thus, would be deductible, unless stipulated otherwise. All
stipulations should be presumed to have economic justification. A
payor seeking to deduct payments made in the year of the
divorce or a recipient seeking to exclude payments made in a
299. Consider, for instance, the example of I.R.C. section 152(e), which deter-
mines which of divorced parents is entitled to dependency exemptions for minor
children. Under section 152(e)(1)(B), the custodial parent provides $1200. In the
latter case, the noncustodial parent is presumptively entitled to the deduction
unless the custodial parent proves that he or she has provided more support
than the noncustodial parent. Treas. Reg. 1.152-4(e) (1971) provides instructions
to taxpayers attempting to meet or overcome the presumptions in the statute.
This is a particularly useful example because it involves a situation where
the IRS might be involved in completely inconsistent litigation with very un-
sophisticated taxpayers.
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year later than the year of the decree or agreement, should be
required to state with some particularity on an attachment to
the return the basis for the deduction or exclusion. The
Secretary of the Treasury should promulgate regulations setting
out whichever of the factors currently used to distinguish bet-
ween support obligations and property settlements 00 the IRS
wishes to retain. These factors should be the bases for ad-
judicating challenges by taxpayers or the IRS to the presump-
tions proposed herein; retaining them would to some extent
refute allegations that the presumptions unduly exalt form over
substance in characterizing divorce-related payments.
Finally, the proposals herein would make the tax law related
to divorce more mechanical. To the extent that making the law
more mechanical makes it more predictable, easier to unders-
tand, and most important, easier for the taxpayer to administer,
the limited exaltation of form over substance is a small price to
pay.
300. See supra Part IV of the text.
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